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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is on the role of interest rate swaps 
in the management of financial institutions. More 
specifically it concentrates on the use of swaps by savings 
and loan associations. Since the stated purpose of interest 
rate swaps is to hedge interest rate risk, the typical 
savings and loan association which holds a large proportion 
of its assets as long-term fixed-rate mortgages while using 
deposits to finance these assets may find the use of 
interest rate swaps to be valuable. 
Explanation of dissertation format 
This dissertation is divided into three main sections. 
Section I is essentially an introduction to the subject of 
interest rate swaps where the following topics are 
developed: the mechanics of an interest rate swap, the 
reasons for usage of swaps, and the history of how the 
instrument evolved. An interest rate swap is an agreement 
between two agents to trade interest payment obligations. 
The most powerful reason for the existence of interest rate 
swaps is the ability to hedge interest rate risk. Interest 
rate swaps evolved from the use of other instruments which 
were originally used to achieve this same goal. 
Section II provides a theoretical model relating the 
use of interest rate swaps and the level of capital in 
savings and loan associations. This relationship between 
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swap usage and capital is then empirically estimated. The 
methodology involves the use of a two-equation, 
simultaneous, three stage least squares model. The results 
suggest that savings and loan associations tend to allocate 
more capital when they engage in swaps. It is also 
suggested that more capital leads to more swap market 
activity. 
The final section presents a test of whether interest 
rate swaps can reduce the fluctuation in stock prices of 
savings and loan associations caused by unanticipated 
interest rate changes. The assets and the liabilities of a 
savings and loan association are financial contracts which 
incur a change in value when the level of interest rates 
change, and as a result the stock price of the firm also 
changes. If interest rate swaps are successful in reducing 
the variability of the net interest income, then this effect 
should be reflected by less variability in the association's 
stock price. The results of this section seem to suggest 
that interest rate swaps have only an indirect effect in 
reducing stock price variability. A possible explanation of 
this limited success is the fact that swap usage is not 
public information and therefore market participants cannot 
directly distinguish between those savings and loan 
associations which are hedging themselves with swaps from 
those that do not. 
The general conclusions of this dissertation suggest 
3 
that interest rate swaps tend to be used more often by 
savings and loans which have higher capital levels and that 
interest rate swaps only have limited success in reducing 
stock price variability caused by unexpected interest rate 
changes. 
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SECTION I. PLAIN VANILLA INTEREST RATE SWAPS: DESCRIPTION, 
REASONS AND HISTORY 
5 
INTRODUCTION 
The first part of this section describes the simplest 
form of interest rate swap called the plain vanilla swap. 
The second part lists the reasons found in the literature 
for the existence of these instruments, and the third part 
reviews the history of how previous financial instruments 
evolved into interest rate swaps. 
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DESCRIPTION OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two 
parties to exchange interest payment obligations without 
exchanging the debt itself.1 Each firm is still responsible 
for repaying its own debt because the swap contract is just 
a bilateral exchange of payments. If one firm defaults on 
its debt the other firm is not liable and merely returns to 
paying its original interest rate on its own debt. The 
amount of debt which they do not exchange but agree to 
switch interest payments on is called the notional 
principal. 
There are a number of different types of swaps, but 
the most typical is the fixed/floating rate swap sometimes 
known as the plain vanilla, coupon, or classic swap.2 in 
this type of swap the first party promises to pay to the 
second at designated intervals a stipulated amount of 
interest calculated at a fixed rate on the notional 
principal; the second party promises to pay to the first at 
the same intervals a floating amount of interest calculated 
according to some floating-rate index on the same amount of 
notional principal. The first party is called the fixed-
^Tanya S. Arnold, "How to Do Interest Rate Swaps," 
Harvard Business Review 62, No. 5 (September/October 1984): 
96-101. 
^Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations 
in International Banking (New York; Bank for International 
Settlements, April 1986), 37-60. 
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rate payer, and the second party is the floating-rate 
payer.3 Usually, a bank acts as an intermediary and 
arranges the swap for the end-users. Many times the end-
users are of different credit worthiness; therefore, one 
party may not agree to the swap unless the cash flows are 
guaranteed by the intermediary. Under some cases, the 
intermediary may become an end-user to both payers by making 
direct swaps to each party and in effect guarantee the cash 
flows in this way.^ 
To demonstrate how a plain vanilla interest rate swap 
works an example used by James Bicksler and Andrew H. Chen 
in their July 1986 article in the Journal of Finance will be 
repeated here. 
To illustrate, assume that a Baa corporation 
can borrow from banks at a floating rate equal to 
the T-Bill rate plus one-half percent and that an 
Aaa corporate borrower can borrow at a floating 
rate equal to the T-bill plus one-fourth percent. 
Also assume that in the bond market the quality 
spread between the two firms is 1.5% for a five-
year bond. The Aaa firm would pay a fixed rate of 
11.5% while the Baa firm would pay a fixed rate of 
13%. That is, the corporate bond market requires 
a quality spread 1.25% larger than the short-term 
credit market. Thus, the two corporate borrowers 
can enter into an interest rate swap agreement and 
capture the economic benefits that result from 
savings in their costs of borrowing. The 
illustrative swap is detailed in Figure 2. 
3James Bicksler and Andrew H. Chen, "An Economic 
Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps," Journal of Finance 41, No 
3 (July 1986): 646-55. 
^Recent Innovations in International Banking. 37-60. 
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Interest 
Rate 
13% Baa 
T+1/2% 
11.5% Aaa 
T+1/4% 
Short-term Long-term 
Figure 1. Demonstration of Quality Spreads 
12% 
Baa Aaa 
T-bill 
T+1/2% 11.5% 
(floating-rate market) (fixed-rate market) 
Figure 2. Direction of Payments in a Plain Vanilla Swap 
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The Aaa corporation issues a bond of $100 million 
at 11.5% and enters into a rate swap under which 
it is paid 12% in exchange for paying a six-month 
T-Bill rate. The net cost to 
the Aaa firm is the six-month T-Bill rate minus 
one-half percent, representing a saving of three-
fourths percent in raising the required amount of 
money in the floating-rate market. The Baa 
company borrows floating rate funds at the six-
month T-Bill plus one-half percent and enters into 
the rate swap under which it pays a fixed rate of 
12% and receives the T-Bill rate. Thus, the net 
fixed rate cost to Baa is 12.5%. In other words, 
the Aaa firm is raising 5-year money at the T-Bill 
rate minus one-half percent instead of having to 
pay one-fourth over the T-Bill rate, a net 
savings of .75%. The Baa firm is effectively 
raising 5-year money at a fixed rate of 12.5% 
(12% paid to the Aaa firm plus the .5% arbitrage 
cost on the floating rate funds). The combined 
savings of 1.25% shared by the two firms 
represent the quality spread differential. That 
is, the arbitrage opportunity between the two 
markets. 
The above example demonstrates the direction of the 
cash flows in a plain vanilla interest rate swap. However, 
this example is somewhat simplified from how swaps are 
conducted in the real world. In the first place it assumed 
that the two parties found each other by themselves. In the 
real world they probably would have gone through an 
intermediary and thus have to pay some sort of fee that 
would reduce the combined savings to something less than 
1.25%.5 More importantly it should be pointed out that the 
^Typically, an intermediary does this by selling a swap 
to one party and then selling an opposite swap to a party 
that wants the opposite position. The intermediary then 
collects the net difference that results from the cash-flows 
of the two swaps. Under market convention, the intermediary 
has an offer price and a bid price the difference of which is 
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combined reduction in borrowing costs of 1.25% is not 
necessarily all true savings. 
In the Bicksler and Chen exemple a Baa rated firm 
seems to have a net cost of 12.5% after the swap rather than 
the 13% it could get directly from the fixed-rate market. 
The Aaa rated firm nets a varieible rate of T-Bill minus one-
half percent, which is three-fourths percent below its 
direct borrowing cost from the variable-rate market. These 
reductions in borrowing costs are partially illusionary. 
For example, the Baa rated firm wanted long-term, fixed-rate 
debt. Instead, it now has an obligation to pay a fixed 
rate, but it still has short-term debt which has to be 
renewed. Therefore, at least part of the .5% reduction in 
borrowing is compensation for the Baa firm for not having a 
long-term commitment from its creditor. 
The Aaa firm supposedly ends up with floating-rate 
debt that is three-fourth percent cheaper than if it 
accessed the short-term market directly. Again, the 
question must be asked, does this firm really want long-term 
debt or was the reduction in the floating rate that it now 
pays a bribe to make the firm accept a long-term debt 
obligation over a short-term one? Another reason why these 
the spread that the intermediary collects. The offer price 
could be the rates at which the intermediary is willing to 
sell fixed-rate exposure, and the bid price could be the 
rates at which it sells variable-rate exposure. Recent 
Innovations in International Banking. 48. 
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cost reductions may be llluslonary stem from Bicksler and 
Chen's assumption that the long-term bond was not callable. 
In the real world many bonds are callcible while most swap 
contracts are not. Therefore, in real world situations part 
of the reduction in the effective interest rate could 
reflect the opportunity cost of the Aaa firm giving up its 
ability to call. 
Thus, the mere difference in quality spreads across 
maturities is not sufficient for a swap to be profitable. 
Instead* the difference in spreads must actually be quite 
large for such a swap to be beneficial to both parties 
ignoring any other reasons why the firms may want the swap. 
Suppose that in the above example the Baa firm was willing 
to engage in the swap and settle for short-term financing if 
its interest cost were one-half percent below its regular 
bond financing, suppose further that the Aaa firm may feel 
that a three-fourths percent reduction in its floating-rate 
interest cost is not adequate compensation for giving up its 
right to call its 11.5% fixed-rate debt and to replace it 
with cheaper fixed-rate debt should interest rates go down 
in the future. If this were the case the combined 1.25% 
difference in quality spread would not be a sufficient 
amount to allow both parties to benefit from such a swap. 
12 
REASONS FOR INTEREST RATE SWAP ACTIMTY 
Smith et al. listed four basic reasons why the interest 
rate swap market evolved.6 A possible fifth reason was 
discovered later by Larry Wall.' 
(1) Profit opportunities from regulatory and tax 
arbitrage. 
(2) Lower transaction costs in managing exposure. 
(3) Financial market integration or completion. 
(4) What the literature calls classic financial 
arbitrage. 
(5) Reduction in agency costs.8 
Examples of the first reason include: differing 
underwriting costs and policies toward bond registration, 
differing disclosure requirements in different markets, and 
different tax laws in different countries. For example, in 
the absence of a swap market a firm wishing to issue a bond 
of a particular currency denomination would have do so in 
the capital markets of that country and thus be sub]ect to 
its securities regulations and tax code. The introduction 
of the swap market allows for the separation of these 
effects, so that the firm could almost pick and choose which 
^Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Charles W. Smithson, and Lee 
Macdonald Wakeman, "The Evolving Market for Swaps," Midland 
Corporate Finance Journal 3, No. 4 (Winter 1986): 20-32. 
'Larry D. Wall, "Interest Rate Swaps in an Agency 
Theoretic Model With Uncertain Interest Rates," Working 
Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, July 1986. 
®The first four reasons came from Clifford W. Smith et 
al., "The Evolving Market for Swaps," while the fifth reason 
came from Larry Wall's working paper. 
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regulation and tax code that it wished to be under.9 
A specific example of the eUaove situation would be a 
previous Japanese policy to tax zero coupon bonds at the 
capital gains rate while having the tax payment delayed 
until maturity. At that seune time the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance was limiting the amount that pension funds could 
invest in non-yen-denominated bonds issued by foreigners. A 
U.S. firm could still borrow from the Japanese pension fund 
even with that limit and the pension fund could still get 
the tax benefit if the fund issued a zero coupon bond while 
making the appropriate swap such that the interest payment 
could be in yen and principal repayment in dollars.10 
In general it is usually the case that if there are 
high fixed costs associated with using a particular market, 
then a larger or higher rated company will have the 
comparative advantage in borrowing from that market over a 
smaller or lower rated company.^ It should also be pointed 
out that opportunities such as the Japanese pension fund 
example could theoretically continue to stimulate the swap 
market as long as differences in laws and tax codes 
continued to exist. 
The second reason, managing exposure, is probably the 
^Smith et al., "The Evolving Market for Swaps," 24-6. 
lOlbid.. p. 25. 
llsicksler and Chen. 
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most important of the five. Basically, when a firm has 
assets and liabilities that are not of matched maturities it 
is exposed to interest rate risk. For example, savings and 
loan associations generally have long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgages as assets but fund these assets with short-term 
deposits.12 By entering into a swap as a fixed-rate payer 
the savings and loan is essentially turning its variable-
rate deposits into fixed-rate financing.13 Such a use of 
swaps could explain why the International Swap Dealers 
Association recently found that financial institutions 
accounted for 64.5% of its swap volume. 
In some cases it may be cheaper for a firm to hedge 
its interest rate exposure with a swap rather than use 
series of futures contracts.15 There are two possible 
reasons for this. First, each time one enters the futures 
market there could be a transaction cost, and this cost 
could accumulate into a large amount especially if one 
needed a futures contract for each interest payment period 
12J. Gregg Whitaker, "Interest Rate Swaps; Risk and 
Regulation," Economic Review; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City 72, No. 3 (March 1987); 3-13. 
13lbid. 
l^International Swap Dealers Association, Quarterly 
ISDA Survey (International Swap Dealers Assoc., Inc., New 
York, Aug. 17, 1987). 
ISciifford W. Smith et al., "The Evolving Market for 
Swaps." 
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over the next several years. Second, an interest rate swap 
could be constructed to last for several years while futures 
contracts that extend that far into the future generally are 
not traded in the financial markets. There therefore could 
be high search costs in finding parties to hold the opposing 
position to such rare futures contracts. Another possible 
advantage of the swap over the futures contract is that if 
the correct swap partner is found, then the swap could be 
fashioned to fit the needs of the firm. For example, the 
floating-rate payments on the swap could be calculated 
according to any number of interest indexes. A disadvantage 
of swaps relative to futures contracts is that if one 
decides that hedging is unnecessary, one can merely stop 
buying or selling futures contracts, but to terminate a swap 
contract is much more expensive. Therefore, the level of 
swap market activity is limited to some extent by the 
relative cost of other such hedging vehicles and the 
prospect of future interest rate levels and stability. 
The third reason, financial integration, refers to the 
fact that interest rate swaps can allow participants to fill 
gaps left by missing markets. For example, interest rate 
swaps behave like a series of forward contracts—one forward 
interest rate contract made for each payment on one's 
notional principal for the desired length of time would give 
one the same result as a single interest rate swap contract 
16 
for that same length of time. Therefore, a swap could be 
used in place of a missing forward interest rate contract.16 
The interest rate swap market also acts as a link between 
the capital and money markets because one swap participant 
may be borrowing from the money market and swapping interest 
payments with an agent who is borrowing from the capital 
market and vice versa.1? The use of swaps could therefore 
be used to artificially create a new instrument out of an 
old one that normally has a fixed rate by giving it a 
variable rate or vice versa. Thus the swap market 
synthetically completes or integrates the financial markets. 
The limit of this reason for swap activity could be almost 
unlimited so long as the need for new instruments increases. 
The fourth reason for the existence of swaps is that 
cost savings may be realized by financially arbitraging 
across different capital markets.IB In the Bicksler and 
Chen article the notion was advanced that the economic 
benefits in an interest rate swap result from the principle 
of comparative advantage. The comparative advantage arises 
from the possibility that there are some market 
IGibid. 
Julian Walmsley, "Interest Rate Swaps: The Hinge 
Between Money and Capital Markets," The Banker 135, No. 710 
(April 1985): 37-40. 
IBciifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., "The Evolving Market 
for Swaps," p. 24. 
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imperfections that allow some borrowers to use some credit 
markets at a relatively cheaper cost than other borrowers.19 
In other words, if prices in various financial markets are 
not mutually consistent, implying financial market 
inefficiency, then firms can reduce their cost of debt by 
borrowing in one place and swapping back. These differences 
in prices would have to come about from some sort of barrier 
that limits access to the cheaper markets. 
Arbitrage, in the classic sense, is the situation of 
taking advantage of different prices for the same product in 
different markets. For example, the trading of currencies 
to take advantage of a difference in exchange rates between 
three currencies is a case of arbitrage. This could be done 
without risk to the trader because she is just taking 
advantage of two different prices for the same product, 
currency in this case, by buying low in one market and 
selling high in another.^0 The financial arbitrage as 
described in the literature with respect to interest rate 
swaps, however, is not necessarily risk free. For example, 
one firm may enter a swap for the purpose of hedging against 
interest rate risk for a certain number of years and if the 
swap partner defaults, the firm may have the cost of trying 
l^Bicksler and Chen. 
Z^Mordechai E. Krenin, International Economics. Third 
Edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1979), 
37. 
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to replace that hedge under a different set of market 
conditions that may make a replacement swap more expensive 
than the original swap. This could be an especially 
expensive situation if the firm is pursuing a set of 
investment and financing plans that depend upon the swap for 
exposure management. To avoid this problem an intermediary, 
if there is one, could guarantee the cash-flows for a fee or 
by directly being an end-party to both firms. In such a 
case the end-users would not have to worry about assuming 
risk of the other party defaulting on the swap. 
One notion of financial arbitrage which was alluded to 
in the previous numerical example is that the smaller 
difference between higher and lower rated debt rates in 
floating-rate markets versus the difference in rates in the 
long-term markets represents an arbitrage opportunity to be 
exploited.21 This notion and the financial arbitrage 
Z^The following citations explain or at least mention 
financial arbitrage of quality spreads across maturities. 
However, not all of these citations support this belief. 
Bicksler and Chen; Clifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., "The 
Evolving Market for Swaps," Midland Corporate Finance 
Journal 3, No. 4 (Winter 1986): 20-32; Jan G. Loeys, 
"Interest Rate Swaps: A New Tool for Managing Risk," 
Business Review; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(May/June 1985): 17-25; Trevor S. Ricards, "Interest Rate 
Swaps Offer Flexible Financing, Lower Interest Costs," Cash 
Flow 5, No. 10 (Dec. 1984): 37-39; Beth McGoldrick, "The 
Interest Rate Swap Comes of Age," Institutional Investor 17, 
No. 8 (Aug. 1983): 83-90; "Variations on a Theme of Swaps," 
The Global Swap Market: Euromonev (June 1986): 2-6; Gilbert 
M. Flick and Grant E. Sardachuk, "Interest Rate Swaps: 
Matches Arranged for Mutual Gain," CA Magazine 3, No. 3 
(July 1985): 36-41; and Stuart M. Turnbull, "Swaps: A Zero 
19 
argument in general has since been criticized by Smith et 
al.,22 by Stuart Turnbull,23 and by Loeys.24 The numerical 
example used previously in this paper called the difference 
in quality spreads an arbitrage opportunity to be exploited 
without considering that these differences may be a desired 
condition in the financial markets.25 The cost reductions 
associated with interest rate swaps may then be more 
apparent than real. 
One of the first to make this observation was Jan 
Loeys. Loeys mentioned in the Business Review that there is 
a tremendous amount of evidence that suggests that financial 
markets are efficient.26 Therefore, the difference in 
quality spreads for different maturities may exist for a 
Sum Game?" Financial Management 16, No. 1 (Spring 1987): 15-
21. 
22ciifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., "The Evolving Market 
for Swaps." 
23stuart M. Turnbull, "Swaps: A Zero Sum Game?" 
Financial Management 16, No. 1 (Spring 1987): 15-21. 
24Jan G. Loeys, "Interest Rate Swaps: A New Tool for 
Managing Risk," Business Review; Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (May/June 1985): 17-25. 
25Bicksler and Chen; Trevor S. Ricards; Beth 
McGoldrick; Gilbert M. Flick and Grant E. Saradochuk; and 
Euromoney, "Variations on a theme of Swaps," The Global Swap 
Market; Euromonev (June 1986): 2-6. 
2®a discussion of the evidence of market efficiency can 
be found in Thomas E. Copeland and J. Fred Weston, Financial 
Theory and Corporate Policy. Second Edition (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983), 
317-53. 
20 
valid reason. For example, an investor would probably be 
willing to lend money to a Baa rated company for a very 
short period of time, say three months, at a small interest 
premium over the rate for an Aaa rated company for the same 
period of time because should the company"s perceived 
position deteriorate the investor could simply refuse to 
renew the loan when the three months are up. On the other 
hand, in order to make a risk averse investor lend money on 
a long-term basis to a Baa rated company he must have a 
relatively large premium over that of an Aaa rated company 
for the same term;27 therefore, from the investors point of 
view the difference in quality spreads exists for a reason. 
In a similiar approach Clifford W. Smith et al. made 
the statement that the very process of exploiting any 
arbitrage opportunity should soon eliminate it.28 while 
this is a more general criticism of the financial arbitrage 
argument and does not specifically address the quality 
spread difference idea that was presented by the Bicksler 
and Chen example, it does make the point that one would 
expect that firms try to go to the cheapest financing 
sources first. If this were true, arbitrage opportunities 
such as extremely large quality spread differentials would 
27jan G. Loeys. 
2®Clifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., "The Evolving Market 
for Swaps," p. 24. 
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not likely be left unexploited. While there does appear to 
be some evidence that quality spreads have become more equal 
in the early 1980s and that the profitability of plain 
vanilla swaps fell during that same time,29 quality spreads 
still do not equal each other.30 
Stuart Tumbull made a similar observation in a recent 
Financial Management article that more closely addressed the 
Bicksler and Chen article. His conclusion was that if 
financial markets are competitive, not all parties to a swap 
can benefit. If parties do benefit, then the growth in 
swaps must be the result of externalities, possibly the 
incomplete markets externality as mentioned earlier.31 
Tumbull's reasoning is as follows. Suppose there are 
two firms A and B where A wants to be the floating-rate 
payer and B, the fixed-rate payer. There is also a 
financial intermediary. If markets are competitive, then 
(1) PVa(variable) = PVa(fixed) 
and 
(2) PVb(variable) = PVb(fixed). 
Verbally this says that the risk-adjusted, present 
Z^Business Week, "Scrambling to Find New Markets for 
Interest Rate Swaps, "Business Week. 9 May 1983, 118. 
SOpederal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 68-72, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Washington, B.C., 1982-1987. 
Slstuart M. Turnbull. 
22 
value cost to each company of using variable-rate debt is 
the same as the risk-adjusted, present value cost of using 
fixed-rate debt. If this were not true, then the firm would 
go to the cheaper source of funding, but such a difference 
would violate the competitive markets assumption. 
The condition for a swap to be beneficial to all 
parties involved is 
(3) [PVa(fixed) - PVa(variable)] + [PVb(fixed) -
PVb (variable) ] > PV + TC^ + TCj, 
where PV is the economic profit that accrues to the 
financial intermediary and TC represents any additional net 
transaction costs to the firms. This equation is very 
similar to the Bicksler and Chen presentation except that 
the costs of debt are presented in present value form. The 
difference in borrowing costs in different markets for each 
firm must exceed the net transaction costs and the positive 
economic profit that the intermediary collects in order for 
the swap to benefit all three parties. However, from the 
competitive market assumption which is the basis for 
equations 1 and 2 and the assumption that TC and PV are 
positive, equation 3 simply cannot hold. In Turnbull's 
words, interest rate swaps are a zero sum game because not 
all three parties can benefit.3% 
From the criticisms presented by Loeys, Smith et al., 
32Ibid. 
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and Turnbull it becomes clear that if markets are 
competitive and reasonably efficient, the notion of 
financial arbitrage of quality spreads across maturities as 
justification for plain vanilla interest rate swaps comes 
into doubt. Unless there are externalities such as 
different tax and regulatory treatments, geographic limits, 
or possibly agency problems such as the one that will be 
discussed next, it is unlikely that classic financial 
arbitrage can continue indefinitely as a source of swap 
market growth. 
Larry Wall of the Atlanta Federal Reserve may have 
discovered a possible fifth reason for swaps. According to 
Wall, interest rate swaps could be used to solve the problem 
of interest rate risk as well as an agency problem that 
could occur between stockholders and creditors within lower 
rated firms.33 Wall concluded that financing with long-term 
non-callable bonds limits the interest rate risk problem 
that a firm would normally have if it financed with short-
term debt. However, he also concluded that long-term bond 
financing created an incentive for the firm to invest in 
suboptimal projects because the creditors do not have the 
ability to raise the rate on their bonds should the firm 
start to invest in risky projects after the bonds have been 
sold. Essentially, the managers would be transferring 
33Larry Wall. 
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wealth from the creditors to the shareholders by investing 
in risky projects. Financing with short-term notes, on the 
other hand, gives the firm the correct investment incentive 
because the creditors can adjust the risk premium each time 
the debt is renewed, but short-term debt exposes the firm to 
interest rate risk. It therefore appears that a combination 
of notes and swaps would solve this problem because if the 
firm was financing with short-term notes the changing risk 
premium would quickly discourage investing in poor quality 
projects. At the same time the swap would reduce interest 
rate risk by allowing the firm to be a variable-rate 
receiver.34 
This firm's agency problem is solved only if the swap 
pays a floating rate based on some risk free index such as 
the rate on T-bills. If the swap paid the total interest 
expense, then the firm would not have the risk premium 
incentive to pick lower risk projects under Larry Wall's 
framework.35 Swap financing would be less expensive than 
straight note financing if the cost of the incentive premium 
to get the other party to do the swap is less than the 
benefits of reduced interest rate exposure. The reduced 
exposure would reduce the probability of bankruptcy while 
the premium to get the other firm to enter the swap would 
34lbid. 
35ibid.. p. 14. 
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increase this risk.36 It is my conclusion that this premium 
incentive is where Wall's agency theoretic model may be 
somewhat limited in explaining the existence of swaps 
because the model only looks at the effect of a lower rated 
firm that is trying to reduce its agency problem. The size 
of the premium incentive is not modelled from the other 
fiirm's point of view. Considering the needs of the higher 
rated firm and the possibility that it could have a similar 
agency problem of its own, the premium incentive to do the 
swap could be prohibitive. However, Wall's observations 
about the agency costs of short-term versus long-term debt 
could still be a contributing factor when used in 
conjunction with the other reasons for the existence of 
swaps. 
This section has just described the most typical 
interest rate swap the fixed/floating or plain vanilla swap 
and has listed and discussed five possible reasons for the 
existence of these instruments. One of these reasons, the 
financial arbitrage argument, has been considered to not be 
extremely valid by some researchers especially when the 
assumptions of efficient, competitive financial markets are 
made. The other reasons at this time have not yet been 
criticized in the literature. While I would agree that 
financial arbitrage is not a likely reason for the existence 
36ibid.. p. 13. 
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of interest rate swaps, I would further conclude that all of 
the other reasons except managing interest rate risk are too 
specialized to have a significant effect on the growth of 
the swap market, and therefore, the major role of the 
interest rate swap today and in the future will be that of a 
hedging instrument, not an arbitraging device. 
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EVOLUTION OF THE INTEREST RATE SWAP 
The interest rate swap is basically a succession to 
the currency swap, and the currency swap was a successor to 
the back-to-back loan. In a back-to-back loan two parties 
in different countries make loans to one another, of equal 
value based upon the existing exchange rate, each 
denominated in the currency of the lender, and each maturing 
on the same date.3? The payment flows are identical to 
those of spot and forward currency transactions. Back-to-
back loans were developed when exchange, controls were in 
force in the United Kingdom in the 1970s which in effect 
limited the access of residents and non-residents to each 
others capital markets. In a back-to-back loan a means was 
provided for non-residents to indirectly borrow fixed-rate 
sterling.38 After the abolition of exchange controls in 
1979, they continued to be used as a means of creating or 
hedging long-term foreign currency exposure at lower costs 
than in the foreign currency markets.39 
The back-to-back loan had some disadvantages. For 
3"^Recent Innovations in International Banking. 37-60. 
3Qibid. The existence of the back-to-back loan is an 
example of regulatory arbitrage (reason number 1). Interest 
rate swaps can be used today to circumvent such regulations. 
39ibid. The reason that the back-to-back loan 
continued to exist after the regulations were lifted is the 
same as reason number two for the use of swaps today. The 
instrument was found to be a cheaper method of managing 
exposure than the standard techniques of that day. 
28 
example, in most cases each loan is a new debt obligation on 
the balance sheet. Also the two loans are usually covered 
by separate agreements. If one party fails to make a 
payment, the other may still be obligated to continue 
payments.40 
The currency swap was developed to avoid most of these 
problems. A currency swap is a transaction in which two 
counterparties exchange specific amounts of two different 
currencies at the outset and repay over time according to a 
predetermined rule which reflects both interest payments and 
amortisation of principal.41 First among its advantages, a 
currency swap does not increase the assets or liabilities on 
the balance sheet. Second, it limits credit risk, since a 
performance failure by one party relieves the other party of 
its obligations. Thus, risk is limited to the cost of 
replacing the expected income streams which depend upon 
interest and exchange rate movements. These rates, however, 
could very well have moved in a direction that would make 
the surviving party better off by the default of the other 
party.42 just like the back-to-back loan, government 
restrictions stimulated the use of currency swaps by 
offering a way to indirectly access European capital markets 
40ibid. 
41ibid.. 37. 
42ibid.. 38. 
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such as Eurobonds.43 
The next step was the extension of the swap concept 
from the currency market to credit market instruments 
denominated in the same currency. The paternity of this 
breakthrough is hotly contested, but most observers agree 
that by 1982 interest rate swaps had grown beyond isolated 
deals to the point where one could speak of a market.*4 The 
most common interest rate swap was the plain vanilla swap. 
Floating-rate payers were usually highly rated European 
banks, and fixed-rate payers were typically Baa-rated U.S. 
companies.45 it is believed by some that interest rate 
swaps first emerged in the Eurobond market in late 1981.46 
Large international banks which do most of their lending on 
a floating-rate basis, were involved in the first swaps so 
that they could use their fixed-rate borrowing capacity to 
obtain lower-cost floating rate funds.4? Initially, the 
swapping partners consisted mainly of utilities and lower-
43ibid.. 39. 
44ibid. 
45ibid. 
46Jan G. Loeys, "Interest Rate Swaps: A New Tool, for 
Managing Risk," Business Review: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia 62, No. 5 (May/June 1985): 17-25. 
47it thus appears that the final step towards the 
development of the interest rate swap was instigated by 
reason number two, the use of the instrument to limit the 
exposure of European financial institutions. 
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rate industrial corporations that preferred fixed-rate 
financing. During 1982, the first domestic interest rate 
swap occurred between the Student Loan Marketing Association 
(Sallie Mae) and the ITT Financial Corp., with Sallie Mae 
making the floating-rate payments to ITT.^® Since then, 
swap volume grew to about $100 million during 1982,49 then 
exploded to $80 billion in 1984,50 to $140 billion in 
1985,51 and then to over $200 billion in 1986.52 it should 
be noted, however, that any figures dealing with the volume 
of interest rate swaps should be viewed with suspicion. One 
must remember that there are at least two, and most times, 
three parties in a swap. Therefore, when interest rate swap 
volume is reported it could be the case that both end-
parties and the intermediary may have reported their swap 
separately, and as a result, the swap may have been double 
or even triple counted. 
Complete data are not available for all of 1987 and 
48jan G. Loeys. 
^^Tanya S. Arnold, "How to do Interest Rate Swaps," 
Harvard Business Review 62, No. 5 (Sept/Oct 1984): 96-101. 
50as estimated by Salomon Brothers in Economist. March 
16, 1985, 30. 
Slciifford W. Smith, Jr., Charles W. Smithson, and Lee 
Macdonald Wakeman, "The Market for Interest Rate Swaps," 
Working Paper Series No. MERC 87-02. Managerial Economics 
Research Center, University of Rochester, New York, 1987. 
SZibid. 
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1988 but there has been some indication that the growth of 
newly issued swaps has slowed substantially from its 
previous pace, especially among savings and loan 
associations.53 In the meantime, interest rate swap 
activity has reached the point where swaps have became a 
high volume, lower margin business, rather than the 
personalized, corporate financial deal that it originally 
was.54 
Both investment banks and commercial banks have been 
active in arranging interest rate swaps. They earn fees by 
bringing the different parties together and by acting as 
settlement agents. Settlement agents collect and pay the 
net difference in the interest payments and serve as 
guarantor of the agreement. Most intermediaries have gone 
beyond their initial role of merely bringing different 
parties together by actually functioning as dealers.^5 in 
other words, each party has an agreement only with the 
intermediary and is totally unaware of who might be on the 
other side of the swap. The intermediary actually sells one 
S^Office of Research and Statistics, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Quarterly Financial Reports of Condition: 
Aaareaate Report of Each of the 12 Districts. Office of 
Research and Statistics, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Washington, D.C., 1987-1988. 
54k. Henerson Schuyler, "The Constraints on Trading 
Swaps," Euromonev (May 1985): 63-64. 
55Jan Loeys. 
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party a swap without having the opposite swap with someone 
else at that particular time. It holds the swap in 
inventory in hope that another firm will later want a swap 
with the opposite position. This arrangement has 
facilitated the development of a secondary market in swaps, 
thereby increasing the liquidity of this instrument. The 
development of a secondary market, in turn, began to allow 
for the reversing, terminating, and general selling of 
existing swaps. 
In 1984 the typical swap involved a bond issue for $25 
to $75 million with a 3 to 10 year maturity on one side, and 
a floating-rate loan on the other.5? Since that time the 
range of sizes and terms has widened. Also, the floating 
rate index typically used was the LIBOR (London Interbank 
Offered Rate); now different rates can be used such as the 
prime rate and the T-bill rate.®® 
Other variations on swaps began to develop at 
approximately the same time such as variable/variable rate 
swaps based on different indexes. For example, a bank with 
assets tied to the prime rate and liabilities based on LIBOR 
could use this tool to hedge itself.59 Another variation is 
S^Recent Innovations in International Banking. 43. 
57jan Loeys. 
58ibid. 
59lbid. 
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an interest rate swap across currencies which could be used 
by firms whose assets are denominated in a currency other 
than its liabilities. It is also possible for firms to 
exchange yields on their assets in much the same way they 
exchange interest payments on debt.^^ 
As a matter of speculation, there could have been some 
other contributing factors to the development of the 
interest rate swap market. For example, the extremely high 
level and volatility of interest rates that occurred during 
the period after 1979 when the Federal Reserve began 
targeting the money supply rather than interest rates®^ may 
have made interest rate swaps more attractive than ever 
before. This would be especially true for financial 
institutions such as banks and savings and loans which were 
undergoing a period of deregulation at approximately the 
same time.62 The higher rate volatility and the increased 
freedom of action may have encouraged financial institutions 
to experiment with such instruments. 
GOibid. 
®^Dudley G. Luckett, Money and Banking. Third Edition 
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984). 
62ibid. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Interest rate swaps are a recent development in 
financial markets which allow firms to exchange interest 
rate payments on their debt. There are known at the present 
time five possible reasons why interest rate swaps exist. 
These reasons include tax and regulatory arbitrage, exposure 
management, classic financial arbitrage, and the reduction 
of agency costs within firms. The development of the swap 
market has its roots in the mid-1970s, and through constant 
modification and development the interest rate swap market 
exists as it is today. The emphasis of the following two 
essays will be on the exposure management aspect of swaps 
and its relationship to financial institutions, specifically 
savings and loan associations. This is an important issue 
that may play a role in the current debate of the regulation 
of interest rate swaps by financial institutions.63 
63^o examples of regulation. Board of Governors Staff 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Treatment of 
Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Contracts in the Risk Asset 
Ratio. Board of Governors Staff and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, March 3, 1987; Federal Home Loan Banks Interest 
Rate Swap. Cap. Collar and Floor Policy Guidelines. 
(Revision) Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., 
March 10, 1987. 
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SECTION II. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
AND CAPITAL IN SAVINGS AND LOAN INSTITUTIONS 
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ABSTRACT 
This section attempts to model the relationship between 
swap usage and the level of capital in savings and loan 
associations. The theoretical model allows for the hedging 
use of swaps by savings and loan associations which hold 
fixed-rate assets financed by variable-rate deposits. If 
interest rate swaps reduce the variability of the net 
interest income of a savings and loan association, then 
there should be less need for a capital cushion. At the 
same time, most firms may not be able to participate under 
favorable terms in the swap market unless they have adequate 
capital to be perceived as sound by prospective swap 
partners or by regulators. The theoretical model 
incorporates both of these effects while the empirical model 
tests to see which effect is stronger. The.results tend to 
show that the managers of savings and loan associations do 
not substitute interest rate swaps for capital. Instead, 
firms that use interest rate swaps tend to have more 
capital. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As stated in Section I, interest rate swaps are 
instruments that allow two firms to swap interest payment 
obligations on some agreed euaount of principal called the 
notional principal.1 The underlying debt obligations are 
not exchanged, only the payments. The desirability of an 
interest rate swap from the standpoint of a savings and loan 
association comes from the traditional balance sheet gap of 
long-term, fixed-rate mortgages financed by short-term 
deposits.2 An association with this structure could find it 
beneficial to swap the variable-rate interest obligations on 
its deposits with some other firm that has fixed-rate debt 
and wants to pay a variable rate. As a result, the savings 
and loan could effectively be paying a fixed-rate on some of 
its variable-rate liabilities. Depending upon the slope of 
the yield curve and other factors, the savings and loan 
could theoretically lock in a riskless profit spread between 
the fixed rate it now pays on its liabilities and the fixed 
^Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations 
in International Banking (New York; Bank for International 
Settlements, April 1986), 37-60. 
Zpor a discussion of the general structure and the 
problems faced by savings and loan institutions see Dudley 
G. Luckett, Monev and Banking. Third Edition (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company 1984). The mention of the 
desirability of swaps for savings and loans can be seen in 
J. Gregg Whittaker, "Interest Rate Swaps; Risk and 
Regulation," Economic Review: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
Citv 72, No. 3 (March 1987); 3-13. 
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rate received on its assets.3 The scope of this study is 
limited to the just described hedging use of interest rate 
swaps. It does not consider firms that are not savings and 
loans that act as intermediaries in the swap market. 
Technically, there is not a formal capital requirement 
imposed by the FHLBB for savings and loan members which 
engage in swaps, but FHLBB guidelines very strongly suggest 
that swaps be collateralized which means that an amount of 
capital should be held that is equal to a stated percentage 
of the notional principal of the interest rate swap.* Since 
collateralization is generally required for possibly risky 
activities such as issuing letters of credit, this would 
suggest that swaps are viewed by the FHLBB to have a 
negative effect on the soundness of the institution. 
Soundness will be defined in this study as the ability of a 
firm to cover its obligations in the event of bankruptcy 
multiplied by the perceived probability of bankruptcy. 
Therefore, the district banks of the FHLB system, which have 
^Obviously if one enters into a swap as a fixed-rate 
payer and variable-rate receiver, then the swap could result 
in net cash inflows when rates rise in the future and net 
outflows when rates fall. The opposite case would occur if 
one where the variable-rate payer and fixed-rate receiver. 
If a firm has variable-rate assets and fixed-rate 
liabilities, then to hedge itself it would have to enter 
into a swap as a variable-rate payer and fixed-rate receiver. 
^Federal Home Loan Banks Interest Rate Swap. Cap. 
Collar and Floor Policv Guidelines. (Revision) Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1987. 
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permission to enter into swaps with member savings and 
loansS, may be reluctant to enter a swap with a member that 
does not have the necessary perceived soundness. Under 
FHLBB guidelines, members are required to use swaps as a 
hedge, and if the district bank is a party to the swap, the 
member must be the fixed-rate payer.& Being in the position 
of the variable-rate payer, the district bank would have to 
enter an offsetting swap with some outside party in order to 
hedge itself from interest rate risk. Therefore, should the 
member institution default, the district bank would still 
have the obligation to the other party to continue making 
the variable-rate cash flows, and it would be exposed to 
interest rate risk until it found another party to replace 
the swap that it use to have with the member institution. 
Given that swap transactions generally involve a transaction 
cost, the district bank has a vested interest in only 
swapping with sound partners to avoid the problems mentioned 
above. Soundness could be achieved by member institutions 
through a number of different methods such as maintaining an 
adequate level of liquidity or by limiting the level of 
credit risk in the loans that it issues, but since the 
relationship between swap usage and capital is the issue to 
be studied, the model presented in this section uses capital 
Sibid. 
6Ibid. 
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as the determining factor of the level of soundness. In 
terms of this study, there may not be a substitution between 
swaps and capital because the swap partner may not permit 
it, especially if that partner is the FHLB district bank. 
To study the effect between savings and loan capital 
and swap market participation this paper uses a mean-
variance, expected utility maximization approach to the 
firm's problem of reconciling the goals of profit and 
soundness. This model draws heavily upon a model used by 
G.D. Koppenhaver and Roger Stover^ which dealt with the 
relationship between standby letters of credit and bank 
capital. Standby letters of credit, like interest rate 
swaps, are off-balance sheet items, so their model lends 
itself with some adaptation to the purposes of this paper.& 
^G.D. Koppenhaver and Roger Stover, "On the 
Relationship between Standby Letters of Credit and Bank 
Capital," paper presented at the 1986 Financial Management 
Association Meeting, New York, October 16-18, 1986. 
8Ibid. For someone to accept a standby letter of credit 
agreement it is suggested that the financial institution be 
perceived as sound, and institutions with greater equity are 
generally perceived as being more sound. Interest rate 
swaps are a similar situation, but at the same time, the use 
of a swap to hedge an institution's balance sheet and lock 
in a profit spread should cause the firm to be perceived as 
safer because of the reduction in its interest rate risk. 
Thus the use of a swap may make capital less necessary. 
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THEORETICAL MODEL 
The model represents savings and loan decision-making 
as a process of maximizing the somewhat conflicting goals of 
profit and soundness. Profit will be represented by a 
return on equity function while the soundness function is 
based on the expected real value of the firm if liquidated. 
Firm decisions affect the degree of soundness explicitly 
through balance sheet decisions and by the amount of swaps 
held. Additionally, the firm is assumed to be risk averse. 
By maximizing profit and soundness while minimizing risk 
this model approximates the behavior of a savings and loan 
association that is trying to maximize its net present 
value. An actual net present value model was not used 
because the purpose of this study was not to see the 
market's reaction (market values) to the firm's swap usage 
decisions, but to determine what those decisions actually 
were (accounting values). 
Assume the firm has a one period planning horizon at 
the beginning of which the quantity of earning assets, L, 
the quantity of equity, K, the quantity of deposits, D, and 
the notional amount of interest rate swaps, S, are 
determined. The rate on earning asset, R^, is known at the 
start of the period. 
Unknown at the start of the period is R^j, the rate on 
deposits. This will be revealed at the end of the period. 
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The uncertainty of is to reflect the fact that savings 
and loans generally have short-term or floating-rate 
liabilities, while the certainty of the rate on earning 
assets is to proxy the long-term, fixed-rate nature of the 
assets. 
The balance sheet constraint is written as follows. 
(1) L = (1 - r)D + K 
where r is the reserve requirement on retail deposits. 
The ex ante decisions (L, K, and S) are constrained by 
the fizm's desire to be sound. A rather general definition 
of liabilities is used in this study so that D would include 
all variable-rate financing. Deposits are assumed to be 
exogenously determined in this model. In practice, savings 
and loans accept all retail deposits that are forthcoming at 
the market rate of interest. Purchased funds enter the 
model's general definition of deposits, yet the firm's 
discretion over the use of purchased funds is ignored since 
purchased funds are generally a relatively small source of 
financing compared to deposit financing. Purchased funds 
are also ignored because interest rate swaps, being a 
hedging instrument, are independent of fluctuating credit 
demands. If this study was on some other off-balance 
activity which was dependent on changes in credit demands, 
then liquidity and purchased funds would be important 
considerations. 
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Soundness is represented as a function of the weighted 
sum of the various items in the balance sheet. It will be 
assumed within this function that the use of a swap will 
decrease the firm's soundness. Though the opposite may be 
true, the representation of swaps causing a reduction in 
soundness is to reflect the widespread desire of regulatory 
agencies to impose some sort of collateralization on swaps.9 
The ex ante expected soundness is denoted by: 
(2) E(T) = OK + 5(l-r)D - $S - OL, 
where E is the expectations operator and the relative size 
of the coefficients are a > n > 6 > 0 and a > $ > 0. In 
other words, expected soundness increases if an increase in 
loans is funded by an increase in equity, and expected 
soundness decreases if the firm is financed by an increase 
in deposits at the expense of equity. No other effects of 
deposits on perceived soundness will be assumed. For 
example, the ability to attract deposits will not be 
considered a signal of soundness to the market because this 
model will assume that D is covered by deposit insurance; 
and therefore, depositors would not have a significant 
interest in imposing market discipline on the firm.^° This 
model will also assume that from the viewpoint of the swap 
^Federal Home Loan Banks Interest Rate Swap. Cap. 
Collar and Floor Policy Guidelines. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, Washington, B.C., March 10, 1987 (Revision). 
lORoppenhaver and Stover. 
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partner that the expected effect of swaps on soundness is 
smaller than the effect of equity. The justification for 
this assumption is that though swaps might require 
collateralization, it is not a 100 percent 
collateralization.il 
Keeping in mind that is a random variable, return on 
equity, ROE, is represented by: 
(3) ROE = JT/K = (RiL - [Rd + P]D - FS)/K, 
with P equal to the flat-rate deposit insurance premium on 
the firm's liabilities. Profit, jr, represents the numerator 
of ROE. The last term in the numerator, F times S, 
represents the net cash flow of the interest rate swap, and 
F is represented by the following function. 
(4) F = I - Rd - eE(T), 
where I and 8 > 0. (I-0E(r)) is the fixed rate that the 
firm would pay in the swap. In turn, the firm receives the 
variable rate R^. Firms that are perceived as sound not 
only are more likely to find a swap partner, but the 
negotiated fixed rate they would pay should decrease as 
perceived soundness increases. Another condition that will 
be assumed is that the expected value of F must be positive. 
This assumption is based on a no-arbitrage condition that 
should exist in competitive financial markets. In other 
launder the FHLBB guidelines the rate of 
collateralization is approximately 2.5 to 3% of the notional 
value per annum. 
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words, the swap is used only for its hedging characteristic 
and not to achieve a reduction in borrowing cost below 
E(B^). Thus, swaps have an expected cash out-flow, but the 
firm is willing to pay this cost just to reduce uncertainty-
-provided that the expected cash out-flow is not too large. 
To simplify the constrained decision making, solve (l) 
for L. Substitute (1) into (2) and (3). Substitute the new 
(2) into (4) and the new (4) into (3) to get (5). Expected 
ROE (return on equity) is then a function of K and S given 
that D is exogenous. 
(5) E[ROE(K,S)] = E[[Ri((l-r)D+K) - (R^+P)D _ SEI-Rj-
e(aK+5(1-r)D-$S-n((1-r)D+K)]]/K. 
Assume that ROE is a continuous variable and that the 
savings and loan prefers a higher ROE to a lower one. In 
other words, the firm's utility function has a positive 
slope with respect to ROE or that U'(ROE) >0. It will also 
be assumed that the firm's utility function is concave 
(U"(ROE) < 0). The concavity of the utility function 
implies that the firm is risk averse. The result of these 
assumptions is that the firm will prefer a certain outcome 
over an uncertain outcome with the same expected value. In 
turn, the firm would have to be offered a higher expected 
value before it would be willing to trade a certain outcome 
for a risky (uncertain) outcome. Furthermore, in terms of 
the Arrow-Pratt measure (-U"(ROE)/U'(ROE)), constant 
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absolute risk aversion will be assumed to help make the 
mathematics more manageable at the expense of a possible 
loss of realism. 
Under these conditions the utility function for the 
firm would appear as follows 
(6) U(ROE) = a - be-AROE, 
where a and b are positive coefficients, e is the base of 
the natural log, and A = -U"(ROE)/U'(ROE). Assuming a 
normal distribution of ROE, maximizing ix-(l/2) (A)Var(ROE) is 
the equivalent of maximizing (6) when fi is the mean of 
ROE.13 
From (3) it can be seen that the variance of ROE comes 
from the variability of R^ since it is the only random 
variable on the right-hand side. Letting a represent the 
standard deviation of R^j, the variance of ROE is as 
follows.14 
l^The derivation of equation (6) under these conditions 
can be found in John D. Hey, Uncertainty in Microeconomics 
(New York: New York University Press, 1979), 46-55. 
13proof that maximizing a function with the form of (6) 
is equivalent to maximizing this statement can also be found 
in John D. Hey, Uncertainty in Microeconomics. 46-55. 
l^The variability of income comes from the cost of 
deposits and the net cash flows from the swap since both of 
these items include R^j in their calculation. 
Var(ROE) = Var[D(Rd + P)/K - S(I - Rd - eE(T))/K], 
since I, 0, E(r), and P are non-random, 
Var(ROE) = Var[(D/K - S/K)(R^)], or 
Var(ROE) = (D/K - S/K)2ff2. 
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(7) Var(ROE) = (D/K - S/Yi)^a^. 
Therefore, letting E(Rd)=R^, (6) can be written as the 
equivalent of maximizing (8)15. 
(8) Maximize [Ri( (l-r)D+K) - (R^+P)D -S[I-R<^ -e(aK+ 
6(l-r) - $S-n((l-r)D+K)]]/K - (1/2)A((D-S)/K)2a2, 
The first order conditions for the maximization of (8) 
are as follows. 
(9) d(8)/dK = [K(Ri+Se(o-n)) - rj/K? + 
[A(D-S)2a2]/K3=0. 
(10) d(8)/dS = [-I+Rd+8((a-n)K+(5-n)(l-r)D-2$S)]/K + 
[A(D-S)a2]/K2 = 0. 
Alternate expressions can be written from (9) and (10) 
to obtain a system of simultaneous equations shown by (11) 
and (12). 
(11) K = AfP-Sl^gZ 
D (Ri ( 1-r) - (R°+P) ) -S (I-RCI-0 ( ( fi-n) ( 1-r) D-$S) ) 
(12) s = -I+BA+8ffa-n)K+f6-n)fl-r)D) + ADgl/K 
20» + Aa^/K 
Investigation of this model suggests that the 
solutions of (9) and (10) are reasonable and fall within the 
relevant choice range [K>0 and 0<S<D]. For example, 
plugging zero in for S in equation (10) demonstrates the 
situation of a firm that does not use swaps. 
ISjohn D. Hey, Uncertainty in Microeconomics (New York; 
New York University Press, 1979), 46-55. 
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(13) d(8)/dS = [-I+R^ +0((o-n))K+(5-n)(l-r)D)]/K + 
ADeZ/K?. 
If this derivative were positive, then the firm would want 
to use a swap. If negative, the firm would choose not to. 
From (13) it can be seen that a firm would not want to enter 
a swap if the fixed rate it had to pay, (I-eE(T))/K, is too 
high relative to the negative utility of interest rate risk 
without swaps, ADa^/K^. 
At the other extreme, this model will not produce a 
solution of D<S as an optimum. One can see this by looking 
at equation (10) and discovering under what conditions this 
partial derivative will be positive when S is the same size 
as D. 
(14) d(8)/dS = [-I+Rd+e((a-n)K+(6-n)(l-r)D-2$D)]/K. 
This derivative could only be positive if the net expected 
cash flow of the swap is positive. However, to expect that 
the cash flow from an interest rate swap will be positive 
when one is the fixed-rate payer would imply that the swap 
captures some sort of arbitrage gain which would reduce the 
firm's cost of financing. Since this study is assuming that 
a swap does not cause any real reduction in the firm's 
expected interest expense, a priori, but merely reduces the 
volatility of the expected interest expense, then D=S and 
D<S are not possible optimal solutions for this model. 
This model also suggests that K=0 is not a rational 
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solution. Though it is difficult to see this by taking a 
second derivative of (9), it can be intuitively demonstrated 
by observing what happens to (8) when K is reduced. While 
TT/K would seem to increase as K decreases it must be 
considered that the terms on a swap, (I-e(E(r)), deteriorate 
as K decreases; therefore, ir decreases as K decreases. At 
the same time, utility is being decreased at an increasing 
rate as K decreases because of the risk aversion term, 
(1/2)Aa^(D-s)As a result, the level of utility will 
be negative before K becomes zero, and will approach 
negative infinity as K approaches zero. A utility level of 
negative infinity under any scale would imply that 
continuing the operation of savings and loan would be 
undesirable, and it would be closed down and liquidated. 
This model suggests that firm equity and interest rate 
swaps are interrelated decisions, and the interrelationships 
between K, S, and the other factors can be observed from the 
derivatives of (11) and (12). Let f(x) be the numerator of 
(11) and g(x) its denominator. Also, let h(x) be the 
numerator and i(x) the denominator of (12) respectively. 
(15) dK/dS = afxlAf2S-2Dlo+ri-R&-8ffa-ni fl-rlD-2$S1ffx) . 
g(xp 
(16)dK/dD=a fx^Af2D-2S)a^-f(1-r)-fR^+P1+S9 r g-nW1-r)f fxl. 
g(x)2 
(17) dK/dRi = -Dfl-r) < 0. 
g(x)% 
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(18) dK/dRd = AfP-SllgZ >o. 
g(x)2 
(19) dS/dK = i fxl e fg-ni -ADj^/kI + fAPg^/K^) h (x) . 
i(x)2^ 
(20) dS/dD = 8fa-nifl-r1 + Aa2./K >0. 
20» + AO^/K 
(21) dS/dR^ = 1 > 0. 
28$ + Aa^/K 
The sign of the partiale represented by (15), (16) and (19) 
are indeterminate. The signs on (15) and (19) are 
indeterminate because the model does not specify the degree 
of risk aversion nor the size of the coefficients that 
determine the effect that K has on the terms of the swap. 
The signs on (15) and (19) are also determined in part by D 
which also is not specified. If (15) and (19) are negative 
it would suggest that equity and swaps are substitutable in 
utility maximizing, risk-averse institutions when there are 
soundness and balance sheet constraints. Positive values 
would suggest that this substitution effect of swaps for 
equity is minimal compared to the collateral requirements 
that swap partners are imposing on the savings and loan 
because of the perceived reduction in soundness caused by 
the swap. 
The sign of (20) is assumed positive if Aa^/K > -8(5-
n)(1-r). In other words, (20) is positive if the increase 
in interest rate risk caused by an increase in D increases 
the benefit of a swap by more than the corresponding 
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reduction in swap terms caused by that increase in D. If 
this were not the case then the sign of (20) is negative. 
The sign for (16) also cannot be determined unless an 
assumption is made on the effect that D has on soundness 
versus the cost of deposit financing. 
Predictions and results of the theoretical model 
In the estimation of equation (11) the coefficient on 
Swaps would be negative if swaps decrease interest rate risk 
sufficiently to reduce the need for a capital cushion. If 
it is positive then the collateralization effect 
predominates. The sign on equation (16) was indeterminate 
so the expected coefficient on Deposits could have either 
sign depending on the relative proportions of the financing 
used by the firms in this sample. 
The model suggestd that should have a negative sign 
and that R^'s should be positive. These results assume that 
if Ri increases, the opportunity cost of using equity 
financing also increases, and if R^ increases, the 
opportunity cost of equity financing is reduced. However, 
since retained earnings are a source of equity and the model 
does not make distinctions between the different components 
of capital, the signs on the coefficients could be reversed 
when the model is empirically estimated if the increase in 
larger net interest income would resulted in additions to 
capital through retained earnings. 
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Two additional variables that were not included in 
equation (11) of the theoretical model were added to the 
empirical model to assist identification during estimation. 
These additional variables are Size and CD. The exogenous 
variable called Size was included as a possible proxy for 
managerial expertise and also because of an expected 
tendency for large financial institutions to be more 
leveraged than smaller ones. As a result. Size was expected 
to have a negative coefficient. CD, representing deposits 
over $100,000, was included as a proxy for the level of 
soundness and liquidity on the assumption that a firm would 
have to be perceived as sound before investors would make a 
deposit that was not covered by federal insurance. The 
expected sign on CD would be positive if higher levels of 
capital suggested more soundness. However, it could also be 
negative if other factors such as managerial expertise, 
liquidity, or overall loan quality were more important to 
the level of soundness than capitalization. 
In equation (12) Capital could have either a positive 
or negative sign again depending on whether the use of a 
swap reduces the need for a capital cushion versus the 
collateralization required by the firm's swap partner. The 
model predicts that Deposits would have a positive sign to 
suggest that more deposits leads to a greater need for 
swaps. is expected to have a positive coefficient in the 
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empirical estimation of (12) according to the theoretical 
model because a larger Rd implies a smaller expected net 
cash outflow for the perspective swap. 
Additional variables were also be added to the 
estimation of (12) for the purpose of identification as was 
done for the empirical estimation of equation (11). The 
exogenous variable Size was again used as a proxy for 
managerial expertise. Under the assumption that only larger 
more sophisticated firms will use an instrument such as a 
swap, the coefficient was expected to be positive. Fixed 
Mort, was included to help identify those firms which should 
be in most need of an interest rate swap, thus the predicted 
effect should be positive. The variable called Short is 
also used as another proxy to identify the need for a swap. 
It should have a negative effect on swap use because if the 
ratio of short-term assets to short-term liabilities 
increases this would imply that the maturity length of the 
assets and liabilities would be more closely matched. In 
turn, this would imply that there should be less need for a 
swap—given that this ratio was always less than or equal to 
one in this sample. ROA was chosen as an another proxy to 
signal swap use because of the possibility that the low 
level of interest rates may have caused unhedged firms to be 
more profitable than hedged firms in this particular time 
period. 
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To test the previously discussed results of the 
theoretical model as well as the hypothesis that savings and 
loan associations substitute interest rate swaps for 
capital, an empirical model will be estimated using data 
made available by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines. 
The next section will present a preliminary examination and 
description of this data set. 
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TABLE 1: Location and Description of Variables 
Variable Equation Definition 
Capital® 22, 23 Regulatory Net Worth/Total Assets 
Swapsb 22, 23 Notional Principal/Total Assets 
Deposits 22, 23 Deposits/Total Assets 
Rd 22, 23 Interest on Deposits/Total Assets 
Rl 22 Interest on Mortgages/Total Assets 
Size 22, 23 Total Assets 
Fixed 23 Fixed Rate Mortgages/Total Assets 
ROA 23 Net Income/Total Assets 
Short 23 Interest Sensitive Assets/ 
Interest Sensitive Liab. 
[less than 1 year] 
CD 22 Dep. over $100,000/Total Assets 
^Capital is the dependent variable in (22). 
bgwaps is the dependent variable in (23). 
59 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET 
The data set consists of the variables listed in Table 
1 for 53 savings and loan associations. The sample of 53 
firms was selected based on the criteria that they all be 
actively traded on a weekly basis during the period from the 
first week in January 1986 to the last week of July 1987. 
It was the researcher's desire to use the same set of firms 
in Section II and Section III. In this way, the managerial 
decisions concerning interest rate swaps and capital could 
be examined in Section II and the market effect of swaps on 
the stock returns of these same firms could be examined in 
Section III. 
Information on the notional principal of interest rate 
swaps used by a particular savings and loan association is 
not publicly available in the FHLB Quarterly Reports of 
Condition. The information necessary to construct the 
variable called Short as well as the amount of mortgages 
that are of a fixed rate is also not publicly available. To 
acquire the use of this data set the researcher had to agree 
by the means of a legal contract not to divulge directly or 
indirectly the identities of the 53 savings and loan 
associations. 
The 53 firms come from all 12 districts of the FHLB 
system. The choice to use information during the time 
period mentioned was determined partially by the necessity 
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of finding a span of time in which as many firms as possible 
were actively traded. Originally, stock price information 
was found for over 80 savings and loan associations, and 
some of these firms had stock price information dating from 
January 1982 to July 1987. However, many of these original 
firms were not actively traded during the entire 1982 to 
1987 time period while others did not have a stock charter 
until very recently. These firms had to be discarded as 
well as those firms whose stock stopped trading early in the 
specified time period. The choice to use information that 
was newer than 1986 stemmed from a discussion with an 
official at the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines who 
suggested that since interest rate swaps are a recent 
development, the likelihood of finding firms that used such 
instruments during the 1984 to 1985 period would be quite 
low. The reason to use information that ended before the 
fall of 1987 was to limit any possible effects in Section 
III that could have resulted from the stock market crash or 
the events that immediately preceded it. As a result, the 
data set consists of balance sheet, income statement, and 
non-public items from the four quarters of 1986 and the 
first two quarters of 1987. 
A preliminary analysis of the data revealed that all 
of the items in Table 2 were larger for the swap using firms 
at a level of significance of 5% or better. This 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Firms in Sample 
(in thousands) 
Non-Swap Using Firms 
Mean Standard deviation 
Total Assets 946867.9 1958032 
Deposits 691120.8 1401363 
Net Worth 52743.1 100914.3 
Net Income 2088.193 5751.223 
Fixed-rate Mortgages 
Short-term Assets* 
212282.6 356135.1 
332416.4 1087393 
Short-term Liab.& 655541.9 1515624 
Large Deposits^ 1155573 458945.9 
Net Worth/Assets .063052 .045777 
Swap Using Firms 
Mean Standard deviation 
Total Assets 4924214 5504066 
Deposits 3125146 3648090 
Net Worth 284883.4 320275.4 
Net Income 9872.832 15762.68 
Fixed-rate Mortgages 
Short-term Assets* 
1262594 1065295 
2157282 3646571 
Short-term Liab.& 3416367 4215567 
Large Deposits^ 834906.8 1318299 
Net Worth/Assets .058926 .019616 
Swaps 264970.3 339756.5 
^Maturity is less than one year. 
^Represents deposits larger than $100,000. 
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essentially reinforces the belief that larger firms are more 
likely to be engaged in the interest rate swap market than 
smaller ones. The range of total assets of the swap using 
firms was between approximately $24 billion and $650 
million. The range of total assets for the non-swap using 
firms was between $5.4 billion and $18.4 million. There 
were three firms that stood out in this sample. All three 
of these firms reported zero short-term assets, short-term 
liabilities, and fixed-rate mortgages. These firms were 
given a value of one for the calculation of the variable 
called Short. 
Table 3 presents an analysis of the variables that 
were used in the estimation of the model. Information on 
each firm was averaged over the length of the data set, and 
then separated between the group of firms that use swaps and 
the group that does not. Since all of these variables are 
normalized by the amount of total assets except the 
variables Size and Short, this table gives a better 
understanding of the differences in proportions between the 
two types of firms. For example, savings and loan 
associations that use interest rate swaps held a 
significantly larger proportion of fixed mortgages in their 
portfolio than non-swap using firms. Also, swap using firms 
used a significantly larger amount of deposits over $100,000 
for financing than did non-swap firms. 
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TABLE 3: Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
Averaged over Q1 1986 TO Q2 1987 
Non-swap Using Firms 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Capital .063052 .045777 
Deposits .797895* .108602 
Rd .014533* .003149 
Rl .015694* .004265 
Size 946867.9®** 1958032® 
Fixed .257333** .123128 
ROA .002179* .001739 
Short .594359* .212031 
CD .094103** .054164 
Swap Using Firms 
Mean Standard deviation 
Capital .058926 .019616 
Swaps .062523 .049862 
Deposits .688756* .084050 
Rd .012785* .001922 
Rl .013134* .003751 
Size 4924214®** 5504066® 
Fixed .314310** .129286 
ROA .001775* .001667 
Short .545683* .181729 
CD .128765** .074679 
^Thousands. 
*This value for the non-swap firms is larger than the 
corresponding value for the swap using firms at a 
significance level of 5%. 
**This value for the non-swap firms is smaller than 
the corresponding value for the swap using firms at a 
significance level of 5%. 
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Non-swap firms, on the other hand, had significantly larger 
mean values of Deposits, Rd, R^, ROA, and Short. Since 
smaller and possibly less sophisticated savings and loan 
associations appear less likely to be engaged in interest 
rate swaps, the heavy reliemce on deposits may be a 
reflection of the size characteristic. The larger mean Rd 
could stem from what was observed by the Deposit variable. 
Essentially, if non-swap firms use a proportionately larger 
amount of deposit financing then it stands to reason that 
those firms would also have a proportionately larger amount 
of interest expense from deposit financing. A more 
interesting observation is that R^ is larger for non-swap 
firms. This is interesting because non-swap firms hold a 
smaller proportion of fixed-rate mortgages. Perhaps this 
could be a contributing factor towards explaining why these 
particular firms do not use interest rate swaps. If a firm 
is fairly profitable while at the same time holding the 
appropriate assets to hedge itself, then there would be less 
need for an interest rate swap. This notion is somewhat 
supported by the fact that non-swap firms had a 
significantly higher average ROA. The variable called Short 
was larger for the non-swap firms which coincides with the 
expectation that a larger value of Short would signify less 
need for an interest rate swap. 
The mean of the variable called Capital was smaller 
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for the swap using firms, but the difference was not large 
enough to be significant at a level of 5%. 
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EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The empirical model of the relationship between equity 
and swaps was estimated by three stage least squares 
regression (3SLS).^® The use of 3SLS was to allow for the . 
possible correlation of the error terms of the one equation 
with the error terms of the other. The model is based on 
the simultaneous model shown by equations (11) and (12) 
while also including the additional exogenous variables 
mentioned before. 
(22) Ai = + Xi?! + e^ (Capital) 
(23) A2 = 6iAi + X2r2 + 62 (Swaps) 
Ai and A2 represent capital and swaps respectively, and 
and X2 are the predetermined variables from the theoretical 
model and the additional exogenous variables. In equation 
(22) the additional explanatory variables Size and CD 
generally were not significant in explaining the level of 
capital while the other explanatory variables that were not 
listed in the theoretical model such as FIXED, ROA, and 
SHORT were not always significant in explaining the 
existence of swap usage in (23). These where included in 
the hope that they would assist identification of the two 
equations by possibly allowing the order condition to be 
l^George G. Judge, R. Carter Hill, William E. 
Griffiths, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee, 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics. 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), 379-86. 
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met. The order condition states that an equation is 
underidentified unless the number of predetermined variables 
in the entire system of equations is greater than or equal 
to the number of slope coefficients in the equation of 
interest.17 Without the additional variables the system is 
not identified because there are only three predetermined 
variables listed in the model. The empirical models were 
also estimated using the natural log of total assets to see 
if there were non-linear relationships between size and 
capital or size and swap usage. The significance of the 
relevant coefficients decreased with this change suggesting 
less fit, so natural logs were not used. 
The correlation matrixes presented in Table 4 were 
calculated using data averaged over the entire time period. 
From the matrixes it appears that there was a moderate level 
of correlation between Deposits and Rd which is logical. 
The second highest correlation was between Short and Fixed. 
These possible sources of colinearity did not concern the 
most important independent variables from a theory 
standpoint. Swaps and Capital, in this system. The third 
highest correlation, however, was between Capital and Rd, 
but re-estimation and transformations did not seem to cause 
any significant change in results. 
l^Henry J. Cassidy, Usina Econometrics; A Beginner's 
Guide (Reston, Virginia; Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 
1981), 236. 
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The empirical version of the theoretical model was 
estimated for each of the six quarters of available data for 
the purpose of supplying as much evidence as possible of the 
hypothesized relationship or lack of relationship between 
swap usage and capital. As a final test the model was 
estimated using observations that were averaged over the 
entire six quarter time period. Though theoretically this 
is a one-period model, it was felt that the measurement of 
the relationship during only one particular quarter could 
give misleading results if there existed some time-dependent 
factors that were not accounted for in the model. 
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TABLE 4: Correlation Matrixes of the Independent Variables 
Equation 22 
D Rd Rj Size CD 
Swaps .42696 -.29654 .13849 -.20775 -.526E-01 
D -.70397 -.532E-01 .13598 .16196 
Rd -.40302 -.677E-01 -.154E-01 
Rl .17842 -.26129 
Size -.20240 
Equation 23 
D Rd Size Fixed ROA Short 
K -.40471 .55627 .22607 -.36603 -.29863 -.38520 
D -.86983 .14691 .44688 -.14119 -.135E-01 
Rd .840E-01 -.42818 .14790 -.118E-01 
Size .515E-01 .404E-01 .346E-01 
Fixed .480E-01 .56851 
ROA .29965 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
It can be seen from Tables 5 through 10 that in the 
estimations of equation (22) where Capital is the dependent 
variable. Swaps always had a positive coefficient for all 
six quarters as well as when the data were averaged over the 
six quarter period (Table 11). This coefficient was highly 
significant during Q1 1987 (t-statistic significant at the 
5% level) and marginally significant (20 or 10% level) for 
every other quarter except during Q3 1986 when it was not 
significant at all. It was also significant at the 10% 
level in the aggregated data estimation. It therefore 
appears that savings and loan associations are using more 
capital financing when they are engaged in interest rate 
swaps. This could imply that savings and loans are 
collateralizing their interest rate swaps which is exactly 
what the regulators want them to do. 
The coefficient on Deposits was positive and always 
highly significant in every estimation of (22). The 
theoretical model was unable to predict the sign for 
Deposits, but obviously in this sample deposit financing is 
a strong indicator that the firm will also use a large 
amount of equity financing. A possible explanation of this 
result could be that given the balance sheet constraint, the 
reserve requirement on deposits could necessitate a large 
amount of equity in order for the total assets of the firm 
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to be fully financed. 
Rd always had a highly significant negative 
coefficient in every estimation which when combined with the 
fact that the coefficient was positive and frequently 
marginally significant seems to suggest that the more 
profitable savings and loan associations tend to have more 
capital, possibly because a larger interest margin would 
make raising equity through retained earnings easier. 
The additional variables that were added for 
identification of equation (22), Size and CD, both had 
consistent negative coefficients but were never significant 
in explaining the level of capital. 
In the estimations of equation (23) the coefficient on 
Capital had no significance during Q1 1986, Q3 1986, and Q1 
1987. But it had a positive coefficient significant to the 
10% level during Q4 1986, and was positive and very highly 
significant in Q2 1986, Q2 1987, and in the aggregated data 
estimation. This last estimation could be suggesting that 
prospective partners are more willing to engage in swaps 
with highly capitalized firms, but the evidence for this is 
not as consistent as what was observed in the reverse 
direction in (22)—that more swap usage implies higher 
levels of capital. 
Deposits was negative and highly significant during Q2 
1986, Q4 1986, and Q2 1987 as well as during the aggregated 
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data estimation. It was negative and marginally significant 
during Q1 1987 and not significant at all during Q1 1986 and 
Q3 1986. While these results disagree with the predictions 
of the theoretical model they are consistent with the 
preliminary examination of the data which found that swap 
using firms had a lower average level of deposits. This 
could be a reflection of the sophistication of the savings 
and loan with respect to its ability to access different 
types of financing, or it could just be a reflection of the 
balance sheet constraint. Since swap using firms tend to 
use proportionately more capital financing it would be 
necessary given equation (1) that they have to use less 
deposit financing. 
Another notable result was that the coefficient on Rd 
was positive as predicted and highly significant during Q4 
1986; Q2 1987, and during the aggregated data estimation. 
It was also positive and marginally significant during Q2 
1986 and Q1 1987. What makes the significant and positive 
effect so notable was that swap using firms tended to have 
lower levels of deposits, evidenced by the results on the 
Deposits variable, and therefore they should have had lower 
levels of interest expense. However, in the estimation of 
(23), the larger is Rd, the larger is the usage of interest 
rate swaps. According to the theoretical model, as deposit 
financing becomes more expensive, the relative cost of the 
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interest rate swap is cheaper. And in turn, the negative 
coefficient on Deposits in (23) and the positive coefficient 
on Rd in (23) could be suggesting that swap using firms 
rationally use fewer deposits because their deposits are 
relatively more expensive compared to non-swap using firms. 
In the case of the additional explanatory variables 
used in equation (23) it was found that Size, Fixed, ROA and 
Short generally had nothing more than marginal significance 
in explaining swap usage and many times they were not 
significant. Size was marginally significant and had the 
expected positive coefficient during Q2 1986, Q3 1986, Q4 
1986, Q2 1987, and the aggregated data estimation. Fixed 
was positive and marginally significant only during Q3 1986. 
It was negative and marginally significant during Q2 1986, 
Q2 1987 and the aggregated data estimation. ROA was 
marginally significant only twice, during Q2 1986 and Q3 
1986, and both times the coefficient was negative. Short 
was negative and marginally significant (20% level) during 
Q2 1986, Q2 1987, and the aggregated data estimation. 
Overall the additional explanatory variables, with the 
exception of Fixed, tended to have the expected sign when 
they were significant. 
In conclusion it appears that the relationship between 
capital and swap usage is essentially positive. Though 
there were some quarters when the signs on the coefficients 
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were negative to suggest possible substitution, those 
particular coefficients did not have significant t-
statistics. On the other hand, when those coefficients were 
positive they also tended to be statistically significant. 
This result tends to suggest that savings and loans are not 
using swaps and capital as substitutes. Holding other 
factors constant, swap usage seemed to imply higher levels 
of capital, and similarly but not quite so consistently, 
more capital tended to imply more swaps. Thus, there is no 
evidence in this study that supports the hypothesis that the 
managers of savings and loan institutions are using interest 
rate swaps and capital as substitutes. 
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TABLE 5: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
First Quarter 1986 
Independent 
Variables Capital 
Dependent Variables 
Swaps 
CONSTANT 
CAPITAL 
SWAPS 
DEPOSITS 
Rd 
Rl 
SIZE 
FIXED 
ROA 
SHORT 
CD 
.4851E-01 
(1.671)** 
.2467 
(1.301)* 
.1818 
(2.242)*** 
-10.1229 
(-3.166)**** 
1.3962 
(1.554)* 
-.34760E-01 
(-.406) 
.4603E-01 
(.405) 
-.2203 
(-.338E-01) 
-.01881 
(-.152E-01) 
-2.904 
(-.462E-01) 
.4877E-01 
(.639) 
.1073 
(.1664) 
-7.5971 
(-.362) 
.4717E-01 
(.869E-01) 
-.3856E-01 
(-.778) 
*Significant to 20%. 
**Significant to 10%. 
•••Significant to 5%. 
****Significant to 1%. 
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TABLE 6: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
Second Quarter 1986 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Capital Swaps 
CONSTANT .4882E-02 
(.949) 
.77554E-02 
(.735E.01) 
CAPITAL 5.9123 
(2.121)*** 
SWAPS .5267 
(1.669)** 
DEPOSITS .4874 
(2.190)^**^ 
-3.0985 
(-2.773)^*** 
Rd -27.2497 
(-5.199)•••• 
118.1153 
(1.377)* 
*1 2.5028 (1.397)^ 
SIZE -.9606E-09 
(-.911) 
.4300E-08 
(1.377)^ 
FIXED -.3066 
(-1.415)^ 
ROA -3.0822 
(-1.371)* 
SHORT -.2648 
(-1.388)* 
CD -.08167 
(-1.330)• 
•Significant to 20%. 
••Significant to 10%. 
•••significant to 5%. 
••••Significant to 1%. 
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TABLE 7: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
Third Quarter 1986 
Independent 
Variables Capital 
Dependent Variables 
Swaps 
CONSTANT 
CAPITAL 
SWAPS 
DEPOSITS 
Rd 
*1 
SIZE 
FIXED 
ROA 
SHORT 
CD 
.5310E-01 
(.938) 
.2452 
(.761) 
.3936 
(3.476)**** 
-19.9137 
(-4.078)**** 
.2011 
(.158) 
-.2308E-09 
(-.194) 
.8084E-01 
(1.956)*** 
-.4603E-01 
(-.659) 
-.1701 
(-.698) 
2.424858 
(.187) 
.1756E-08 
(1.616)** 
.1134 
(1.577)* 
-3.0863 
(-1.413)* 
.1615E-01 
(.345) 
-.1012 
(-1.523)* 
*significant to 20%. 
**Significant to 10%. 
***Significant to 5%. 
••••Significant to 1%. 
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TABLE 8: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
Fourth Quarter 1986 
Independent Deoendent Variables 
Variables Capital Swaps 
CONSTANT -.303912E-01 
(-.4169) 
.7719871E-01 
(1.2244) 
CAPITAL 2.670263 
(1.955)^^ 
SWAPS .6660956 
(1.8885)^^ 
DEPOSITS .5035239 
(2.9247)^^^^ 
-.9234809 
(-3.7751)•••• 
Rd -23.13531 
(-3.4688)•••• 
42.34172 
(3.0891)^**^ 
*1 1.228487 (.8890) 
SIZE -.1436848E-08 
(-1.1338) 
.367720E-08 
(1.859)^^ 
FIXED -.1143020 
(-.8491) 
ROA -7.078763 
(-.9673) 
SHORT -.9326677E-01 
(-1.0461) 
CD -.5804891E-01 
(-.83-59) 
•Significant to 20%. 
••Significant to 10%. 
•••Significant to 5%. 
••••significant to 1%. 
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TABLE 9: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
First Quarter 1987 
Independent Dependent Variables 
Variables Capital Swaps 
CONSTANT -.4694612E-01 
(-.6002) 
.2284310E-02 
(.1092) 
CAPITAL 5.872125 
(1.0410) 
SWAPS .7818891 
(2.1430)*** 
DEPOSITS .5560404 
(2.9029)•••• 
-1.469256 
(-1.5871)• 
Rd -27.9607 
(-3.4309)^^^^ 
82.34366 
(1.3207) 
Ri "if 2.962489 
(1.6850)^^ 
SIZE -.7883958E-09 
(-.5894) 
.6151147E-08 
(.8588) 
FIXED -.2846744 
(-.9494) 
ROA -34.97691 
(-.8277021) 
SHORT -.2814818 
(-.84267) 
CD -.1050190 
(-1.2600) 
•Significant to 20%. 
••Significant to 10%. 
•••Significant to 5%. 
****Significant to 1%. 
80 
TABLE 10: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
Second Quarter 1987 
Independent 
Variables 
Deoendent Variables 
Capital Swaps 
CONSTANT .4881632E-01 
(.9493E-01) 
.1331 
(1.866)•• 
CAPITAL 2.2821 
(1.492)• 
SWAPS .5267137 
(1.670)*• 
DEPOSITS .4874061 
(2.9029)^^^^ 
-.8238 
(-2.427)^^^ 
Rd -27.24970 
(-5.1990)^^^^ 
36.5600 
(1.919)•• 
Ri 2.502849 
(1.3473)^ 
SIZE -.9605801E-09 
(-.9113) 
.2710E-08 
(1.366)• 
FIXED -.16570 
(-1.004) 
ROA -9.4803 
(-.819) 
SHORT -.1296 
(-.990) 
CD -.8167377E-01 
(-1.3302>^ 
•Significant to 20%. 
••Significant to 10%. 
•••Significant to 5%. 
****Significant to 1%. 
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TABLE 11: Three Stage Least Squares Results 
Data Averaged over Entire Period 
Independent 
Variables Capital 
Dependent Variables 
Swaps 
CONSTANT 
CAPITAL 
SWAPS 
DEPOSITS 
Rd 
Rl 
SIZE 
FIXED 
ROA 
SHORT 
CD 
-.9570E-01 
(.901) 
1.1898 
(1.869)** 
.5707 
(2.897)**** 
-23.4800 
(-3.805)**** 
2.3882 
(1.162) 
-.15911E-08 
(-.956) 
.7754992E-02 
(.7355) 
5.91230 
(2.1205)*** 
-2.098583 
(-2.7734)**** 
118.1153 
(2.5591)*** 
.4299882E-08 
(1.3771)* 
-.3066158 
(-1.4153)* 
-30.82223 
(-1.2717) 
-.2648113 
(-1.3882)* 
-.8830E-01 
(-.982) 
*Significant to 20%. 
**Significant to 10%. 
***Significant to 5%. 
****Significant to 1%. 
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SECTION III. DO INTEREST RATE SWAPS REDUCE THE EFFECT 
OF INTEREST RATE CHANGES ON COMMON STOCK RETURNS 
OF SAVINGS AND LOAN INSTITUTIONS? 
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ABSTRACT 
This section examines the ability of interest rate 
swaps to reduce the interest rate sensitivity of common 
stock returns of savings and loans. First, the sensitivity 
to interest rate changes is estimated for each firm in the 
sample. Next, the sensitivities for all institutions are 
tested to see if they are negatively correlated to the use 
of interest rate swaps. The results show that while the net 
total effect ia close to zero, the hypothesized indirect 
effect is definitely negative, thus giving limited support 
to the idea that swaps can reduce the interest rate 
sensitivity of a firm's stock prices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Previous empirical research suggests that there is a 
relationship between interest rate movements and common 
stock returns,^ in this context, Flannery and James 
formulated the hypothesis that the interest rate sensitivity 
of a firm's common stock returns will depend upon the firm's 
holdings of net nominal assets as well as the maturity 
composition of those net nominal assets.2 Nominal assets or 
liabilities have cash flows that are fixed in nominal terms, 
and as a result, their present value changes as interest 
rates change. It will be assumed that financial 
institutions hold assets and liabilities consisting almost 
entirely of nominal contracts, and therefore this study will 
not be quite as concerned with the proportion of net nominal 
assets held by the different firms as the difference in the 
maturity of those items on their balance sheets.3 The 
maturity mismatch hypothesis as presented by Flannery and 
James postulates that differences in the maturity 
composition of net nominal assets cause differences in the 
^H. Russel Folger, Kose John, and James Tipton, "Three 
Factors, Interest Rate Differentials and Stock Groups," 
Journal of Financial Economics 5, No. 2 (November 1977): 
115-46. 
^Mark J. Flannery and Christopher M. James, "The Effect 
of Interest Rate Changes on the Common Stock Returns of 
Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance 39, No. 4 
(September 1984): 1141-53. 
3Ibid. 
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interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns.* in 
other words, if a firm holds a large quantity of long-term 
nominal assets and finances mostly with short-term 
liabilities (long maturity of the net nominal assets), its 
common stock returns would incur a large decrease should 
rates go up, while a firm with a shorter maturity of net 
nominal assets will suffer a smaller decrease. 
The interest rate sensitivity of a typical savings and 
loan association, which generally has assets with long 
maturity, should be reduced if the firm enters a swap as a 
fixed-rate payer (a hedging swap). The reason is that the 
swap would make its liabilities behave as if they had a 
longer maturity, thus making the nominal assets and 
liabilities more closely matched. Based on the methodology 
of Flannery and James this section first estimates the 
sensitivity of common stock returns of savings and loan 
associations and then tests whether their sensitivity is 
determined by the maturity composition of the firm's nominal 
assets. Most importantly, this study will also test whether 
sensitivity is affected by the use of interest rate swaps. 
Path Analysis will be used to make this test to allow for 
the fact that the amount of interest rate swaps is a latent 
variable, meaning that it cannot be directly observed. Swap 
usage by savings and loan associations is not a publicly 
4Ibid. 
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available statistic, therefore any effect of interest rate 
swaps on stock price sensitivity must operate through 
observable intermediate variables. 
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MEASURING INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY ON COMMON STOCK 
RETURNS FOR SAVINGS AND LOANS 
The first part of the methodology is to model interest 
rate sensitivity.5 
(1) Rj = ^oj + ^ sj^s ^uj®u + ®j^ 
Sjames A. Brickley and Christopher H. James, "Access to 
Deposit Insurance, Insolvency Rules and Stock Returns of 
Financial Institutions,*' Journal of Financial Economics 16 
(1986): 345-371. Equation (1) in this section is also 
similar to equation (2) in Flannery and James's Journal of 
Finance Sept. 1984 article. 
®This equation is estimated for every firm in the data 
set by ordinary least squares (OLS). A possibly better 
method of estimation could be the seemingly unrelated 
regressions technique (SUR) because there could be 
correlation of the error terms among the different equations 
because of omitted factors that could affect the returns of 
some or all of the firms in the data set. Though SUR would 
seem to be a more efficient technique and a more powerful 
test than OLS in equation (1), it will not be used. Among 
the requirements of SUR are that there can be no missing 
observations, that the data matrixes must have more price 
observations than estimated equations (firms), and that the 
number of observations for each firm must be equal. 
Considering that fourteen firms missed an occasional stock 
price quote for a particular week the requirements for using 
SUR would have disqualified close to a third of the data. 
Thus the increase in efficiency of using SUR would come at 
the price of using much smaller data sets for the 
estimations. 
There are, however, two cases when OLS and SUR are 
computationally equivalent. One case is when the error 
terms are truly not correlated which is a case that cannot 
be empirically proved, and the other case is when each 
equation uses exactly the same X matrix. This latter case 
was found to be true when the researcher estimated (1) using 
SUR on those firms which did not have missing observations 
and found that the coefficients and t-statistics were the 
same as the OLS estimates. George G. Judge, R. Carter Hill, 
William E. Griffiths, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee, 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics. 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), 315-33. 
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where 
Rj _ the one week holding period return to the 
jth savings and loan's stock, not including 
dividends.^ 
Rg = the one week holding period return on the NYSE 
Index, not including dividends (representative of the 
market portfolio) 
Ru = the unanticipated changes in the holding 
period return on one-year T-Bills.^ 
is a measure of the correlation between the individual 
stock returns and the market's returns. The focus of this 
paper however, is on , the measure of the effect of 
unanticipated interest rate changes on the common stock 
> 
return of firm j. Since bond prices are negatively related 
to interest rates, a positive value for implies that the 
firm's market value of equity decreases when there is an 
7using weekly stock prices, Rj = - Pp . 
Po 
8RS = NYSEJ - NYSEQ . 
NYSEQ 
A rationale for including a market return variable is that 
some of the variability in S & L stock prices may be caused 
by many of the same factors that would affect stock prices in 
general, not just interest rate changes. 
®The weekly holding period return to T-Bills is 
calculated in the same way that the NYSE and savings and 
loan stock returns were calculated. As a result, a decrease 
in interest rates would increase the holding period return 
because the T-Bill price would increase ([PTi-PTqI/PTo); 
however, the anticipated and unanticipated components of the 
holding period returns are found by the use of an ARIMA(1,0) 
model developed through the Box-Jenkins methodology. The 
predicted values of the ARIMA model would represent the 
anticipated changes in weekly holding period returns, and Ry 
would be the residuals or error terms from that model. 
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unanticipated increase in interest rates. 
Equation (1) was estimated for each of the 50 firms in 
the sample using 83 weeks of market data. hat is 
therefore the estimated average sensitivity for firm j over 
an 83 week period. 
lOlt is possible that there is some influence on stock 
market prices from interest rates and vice versa. These 
inter-relationships could have caused multicollinearity to 
exist in this model if the independent variables were just 
the holding period return to the stock market and T-Bills. 
To avoid this problem a number of different versions of this 
model were estimated including several versions in which the 
variables were orthogonalized. Equation (1), though not 
orthogonalized, yielded the best results. R^, the residuals 
from an autoregression of T-Bill returns, was used not only 
to represent unanticipated changes in T-Bill returns, but 
also because the mathematical transformation seemed to have 
removed most of the multicollinearity the interest rate 
variable had with respect to Rg. 
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MODELLING THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS ON SENSITIVITY 
If the interest rate sensitivity of savings and loan 
associations is related to the maturity composition of net 
nominal assets, then hat should vary directly with the 
difference between the average maturities of the firm's 
assets and liabilities. Also, since interest rate swaps 
indirectly lengthen the average maturity of the firm's 
liabilities, then swap usage and /9uj hat should be inversely 
related. 
To model these relationships Flannery and James's 
constructs were heavily relied upon. A measure of the 
maturity mismatch called SHORT which used by Flannery and 
James (the amount of assets most subject to repricing within 
one year divided by the amount of liabilities most sub]ect 
to repricing within the same time period) was also used 
here. Theoretically, the higher the value of SHORT, the 
more closely matched are the maturities of the assets and 
liabilities, and the less sensitive should be the stock 
price—provided that SHORT does not exceed a value of one. 
Other factors thought to have an effect on interest 
rate sensitivity were also tested. One such variable was 
the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of equity 
(DEBT/MV). This variable was used in a similar model by 
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Brickley and James.11 It was included in this study under 
the assumption that more financial leverage would lead to 
more variability in stock price. A change in interest rates 
can change the net cash flow of the firm by changing the 
interest expense paid on variable-rate deposits. 
Therefore, if interest rates go up not only would there be a 
tendency for the present value of future cash flows to 
decrease, but the net cash flows themselves will be smaller 
causing an even larger reduction in present value (stock 
price). 
Another variable that was included was the ratio of 
fixed-rate mortgages to the market value of equity 
(FIXED/MV). Though Brickley and James used SHORT as a proxy 
for the measure of maturity mismatch, FIXED/MV was 
constructed as a second test of their hypothesis. Assuming 
that a larger value of FIXED/MV implies a longer net 
maturity of the assets, FIXED/MV should be positively 
related to the stock price's sensitivity to unanticipated 
changes in the level of interest rates. 
The last and most important independent variable in 
this study is (SWAP/MV), the ratio of the notional principal 
of interest rate swaps held to the market value of equity. 
lljames A. Brickley and Christopher M. James, "Access 
to Deposit Insurance, Insolvency Rules and Stock Returns of 
Financial Institutions," Journal of Financial Economics 16, 
(1986); 345-71. 
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An interest rate swap, being a hedging instrument, should 
reduce price sensitivity. However, since swap usage is not 
publicly available information on the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Quarterly Report of Condition, the path of the effect of 
SWAP/MV could be through the other independent variables. 
Path analysis will be used to model this possibility. 
Model building with path analysis 
The following description of path analysis was 
condensed from a technical bulletin written by M. G. Kendall 
and C. A. O'Muircheartaigh for the World Fertility Survey. 
Suppose that one wished to estimate a dependent 
variable, y, using two independent variables, and X2. If 
the mechanism by which the explanatory variables evoke a 
response in y is of no interest, then the causal links 
between the x's and y could be estimated directly. Now 
suppose that one is interested in the mechanism between the 
x's and y. For example, suppose one has reason to believe 
that while X2 directly affects y, X2 is also influenced by 
x^. Therefore, x^ has a direct effect on y and an indirect 
effect on y through X2. Diagrammatically this relationship 
is demonstrated by Figure 1. Mathematically the 
relationship would appear as: 
l^M. G. Kendall and C. A. O'Muircheartaigh, "Path 
Analysis and Model Building," world Fertility Survey: 
Technical Bulletins. International Statistical Institute, 
Prinses Betrixlaan 428, Voorburg, The Hague, Netherlands, No. 
2, Tech. 414 (March 1977), 1-27. 
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(2) X2 = P21X1 
(3) y = Poi*! + P02*2' 
If standardized variables are used the coefficient found 
by the use of OLS represents the direct path coefficient 
between variable m to variable n. The first subscript is 
the dependent variable and the second identifies the 
variable whose direct effect is measured by the path 
coefficient. A subscript of 0 represents y. A disturbance 
term could be added to the right of each equation to 
represent a variety of unmeasured sources of variation with 
no effect on this estimation provided the disturbance term 
is assumed to have a mean of zero and be uncorrelated with 
the other immediate determinants of the dependent variable. 
The total effect of on y is defined as the 
correlation (roi) between these two variables. The direct 
and indirect effects of on y can be found through the 
decomposition of the correlations in the system or by using 
the standardized coefficients calculated by OLS. The second 
method is explained here. 
(4) Total effect = Direct effect + Indirect effect. 
(5) rgl = poi + (P21)(P02)• 
It should be noted that the total effect of X2 on y is 
not the correlation between these two variables, ro2/ 
because part of the correlation is caused by the effect that 
Xi has through X2. Therefore, the total effect of X2 is the 
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direct effect, Po2* 
The application of path analysis is appropriate for 
this study because the non-public characteristic of swap 
usage may cause there to be no real direct effect of swaps 
on interest rate sensitivity, and if there is an effect at 
all it has to be indirect through other variables. 
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Figure 1. Example of a Path Diagram 
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Path model 
The path model used in this study is represented by 
the equations (5) through (8) and by Figure 2 on page 110. 
(5) SHORT = Pi4(SWAP/MV) 
(6) FIXED/MV = p24(SWAP/MV) 
(7) DEBT/MV = P34(SWAP/MV) 
(8) /3uj hat = Poi (SHORT) + Po2 (FIXED/MV) + 
P03 (DEBT/MV) + Po4 (SWAP/MV) . 
The expected sign of the path coefficient P14 in equation 
(5) is negative because it is assumed that the use of a swap 
makes it less necessary for the firm to have matched 
maturities of its assets and liabilities. The path 
coefficient P24 in (6) is expected to be positive for the 
same reason that P14 was negative. The expected sign of P34 
is expected to be positive if it is assumed that the use of 
a hedging instrument such as a swap to reduce the 
variability of stock returns allows the firm to use more 
leverage. 
In equation (8) if one were to imply that the effect 
on the return to equity from interest rate changes is 
proportional to the value of SHORT and given that the bond 
index is negatively related to changes in interest rates, 
then the expected sign of the path coefficient of SHORT on 
should be negative. In other words, an increase in net 
short-term assets (SHORT), implying a decrease in long-term 
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assets and/or an increase in long-term liabilities, should 
make /S^j hat smaller. The larger the SHORT variable is, up 
to a ratio of one, the less sensitive the firms common stock 
return should be to interest rate changes. FIXED/MV is 
expected to have a positive effect on sensitivity. If more 
fixed-rate mortgages are held, then the overall maturity of 
the firm's assets will be longer, and the value of the firm 
should change proportionately more as interest rates change. 
Equation (8) tries not only to explain the interest 
sensitivity of the firm's common stock returns as a function 
of the firm's maturity composition (SHORT or FIXED/MV) but 
also as a function of financial leverage (DEBT/MV). 
According to Brickley and James the coefficient should be 
negative between DEBT/MV and )9yj hat because of what they 
call the subsidy hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, 
there have been changes in insolvency rules since 1979 which 
cause the value of access to deposit insurance to increase 
as an S & L approaches insolvency. This in turn, should 
cause a reduction in hat since 1979. However, in the 
absence of this subsidy effect the sign of pg^ should be 
positive as more leverage should lead to more interest rate 
sensitivity.13 Since the data in this study only go back to 
l^Brickley and James had a negative coefficient when 
they did a similar estimation, and this was consistent with 
their subsidy hypothesis. However, in their paper the 
expected positive effect of leverage may have been 
overpowered by other factors such as firm size. There is 
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1986 and therefore do not overlap the time periods in which 
the insolvency rules changed, the sign for this coefficient 
in this study is expected to be positive. 
The use of an interest rate swap as a fixed-rate payer 
is the same as using proportionately more long-term 
liabilities; thus, one would expect the direct effect of 
SWAP/MV to be negative. One must remember, however, that 
the use of a swap by a savings and loan association is not 
public information. Therefore, if the market does recognize 
an effect on interest sensitivity because of swap usage it 
must do this through some indirect method. The inclusion of 
SWAP/MV having a direct effect is to allow for the existence 
of other ways, besides the indirect methods in this study, 
by which the firms may signal to the market that they are 
hedging with an interest rate swap. 
some evidence that large financial institutions effectively 
hedge themselves against market risk. [See Mark J. Flannery, 
"Market Interest Rates and Commercial Bank Profitability: An 
Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance 36, No. 6 
(December 1981): 1085-1100.] Given the tendency of large 
financial institutions to use more leverage than smaller 
ones [See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Savings and Loan 
Fact Book (Washington, D.C.; Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
1986.], it could therefore be that firm size was the 
explanation why Brickley and James had a negative rather 
than the normally expected positive coefficient. 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET 
All of the above equations were estimated using stock 
price data and Federal Home Loan Bank Quarterly Reports of 
Condition from January 1986 through July 1987.14 This time 
period was chosen because the use of swaps was not a 
widespread phenomenon until recently.15 This is especially 
true for S & L's which did not officially have approval from 
the FHLBB to engage in interest rate swaps until February 
1984.16 The data set stops before the Fall of 1987 to avoid 
possible complication caused by the October crash or the 
events surrounding that time. 
The information needed to calculate the variable 
SHORT, and the information on swap usage can only be found 
in the internally circulated Federal Home Loan Bank 
Quarterly Reports, not the publicly available reports. 
The information from the reports was averaged over the 
entire time period. For example, FIXED/MV represents the 
l^The financial statement data for Section II and 
Section III of this dissertation came from the Federal Home 
Loan District Bank of Des Moines. This information was 
released to me with the legal agreement that I do not 
directly or indirectly identify the Savings and Loans in 
this sample. 
l^Office of Research and Statistics, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Quarterly Financial Reports of Condition. Office 
of Research and Statistics, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Washington, D.C., 1986-1987. 
IGjames Bicksler and Andrew Chen, "An Economic Analysis 
of Interest Rate Swaps," Journal of Finance 41, No. 3 (July 
1986); 645-655. 
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average amount of fixed-rate mortgages held over the time 
period divided by the average market value of the equity 
over the time period. 
Table 2 on page 106 demonstrates the differences 
between the non-swap and swap using firms in the sample. 
Swap using firms have larger mean total assets, 
proportionately more fixed-rate mortgages, and certificates 
of deposits. Non-swap using firms tended to have a larger 
return on assets, better matching of their maturity 
structure as demonstrated by the ratio of short-term assets 
to short-term liabilities, and a larger proportion of assets 
financed by deposits. 
Table 3 on page 107 describes the variables that were 
used in the estimation of equations (5), (6), (7), and (8). 
The mean values of DEBT/MV and FIXED/MV were larger for the 
swap using firms, but these variables tended to have large 
standard deviations. 
The correlation matrix in Table 4 indicates that there 
is a large positive correlation between FIXED/MV and 
DEBT/MV. The implication could be that firms that have a 
large proportion of their assets in fixed-rate mortgages 
tend to use more leverage. The variable SHORT is not highly 
correlated with the other independent variables of FIXED/MV, 
DEBT/MV, and SWAP/MV. The correlation with SWAP/MV, 
however, is negative which lends support to the notion that 
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swap usage may reduce the need to match maturities. The 
correlation between SWAP/MV and FIXED/MV is moderately large 
and positive. This could support suspicions that swap 
usage is associated with firms that have a high proportion 
of fixed-rate mortgages. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As predicted, the use of swaps has a negative path 
coefficient in determining SHORT. Though that relationship 
was not significant, the path coefficient from SWAP/HV to 
FIXED/HV was positive and significant, thus suggesting that 
the use of swaps is associated with less matching of the 
maturities of the assets and liabilities. In other words, 
the use of swaps implies higher levels of fixed-rate 
mortgages. 
The path coefficient from SWAP/MV to DEBT/MV was 
positive and significant which is consistent with the notion 
that if firms believe that interest rate swaps reduce stock 
price sensitivity, then more leverage can be used. 
The most important results come from the estimation of 
equation (8). It is at this stage where the direct and 
indirect effects of interest rate swaps on hat can be 
analyzed. First, the sum of the indirect effects through 
SHORT, FIXED/MV, and DEBT/MV was negative. The path 
coefficient on SHORT was negative as expected but not 
significant. The coefficient on DEBT/MV was positive and 
significant confirming that more leverage leads to more 
sensitivity. 
The most dramatic result was that the path coefficient 
on FIXED/MV was negative and highly significant which is 
totally opposite from what one would normally expect. 
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Possibly this could be a signal that the use of interest 
rate swaps is effective in hedging interest rate risk, and 
that the path effect could be through the FIXED/MV variable. 
Other factors were examined that could have caused the 
negative path coefficient on FIXED/MV, but these were not 
found to be of likely importance. For example, it is 
possible for savings and loan associations to derive income 
from service fees and other non-balance sheet items rather 
than relying entirely on interest income. This, however, 
would not have much of a reducing effect on stock price 
sensitivity unless such income was relatively large and not 
correlated to interest rates in a similar fashion as the 
rest of the income statement. In fact, fee income is 
relatively small, and many times off-balance sheet items are 
closely related to interest rate levels. Another possible 
reason for the negative coefficient on FIXED/MV was that 
there may be some multicollinearity between FIXED/MV and 
DEBT/MV, but when (8) is estimated without DEBT/MV, FIXED/MV 
still has a negative path coefficient. In any case, the 
final result is that the sum of the indirect effects of 
SWAP/MV is negative, meaning that interest rate swaps may 
have some influence in reducing interest rate sensitivity of 
stock prices. 
The direct effect from SWAP/MV was included in the 
model to allow for other possible paths to which the market 
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can recognize the use swap hedging. It must be remembered, 
however, that theoretically a direct effect from SWAP/MV to 
/S^j hat is not valid if swaps are not directly observable. 
Regardless, the sign of this path coefficient was positive, 
significant, and slightly larger than the negative total of 
the indirect effects. The most likely explanation for these 
results is that because interest rate swaps are not public 
information they cannot be recognized by the market and have 
a real direct effect. As a result, the volume of swaps in 
this study may act as an identifier of those firms that do 
have an interest rate sensitivity problem caused by a high 
degree of leverage or a large investment in fixed-rate 
mortgages. 
In conclusion, it appears that the use of interest 
rate swaps may have an indirect effect in reducing the 
sensitivity of common stock prices for savings and loan 
associations to unanticipated changes in interest rates, but 
the unavailability of information on swap usage is a severe 
limitation to determining definite results. 
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TABLE 1: Location and Description of Variables 
Variable Equation number Definition 
SHORT 5, 8 Interest sensitive 
assets/Interest 
sensitive liabilities 
DEBT/MV 1 ,  8 Total liabilities/ 
market value of equity 
FIXED/MV 6, 8 Fixed-rate mortgages/ 
market value of equity 
/3uj hat 8 The estimate of the 
sensitivity of the 
stock price to 
unexpected changes in 
weekly bond returns 
(independent variable) 
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics of Firms 
Non-swap Firms (29 firms) 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Total Assets 
Capital Ratio 
Return on Assets 
Fixed-rate Mort./Assets 
Jumbo CD's/Assets 
Deposits/Assets 
Short-term Assets/Liab. 
946867900** 
6.305% 
.2179%* 
25.73%** 
9.41%** 
79.79%* 
.5826* 
1958032000 
4.578% 
.1739% 
12.31% 
5.41% 
10.86% 
.19953 
Swap-using Firms (21 firms) 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Total Assets 
Capital Ratio 
Return on Assets 
Fixed-rate Mort./Assets 
Jumbo CD's/Assets 
Deposits/Assets 
Short-term Assets/Liab. 
Swaps/equity(MV) Ratio 
4924214000** 
5.739% 
.1775%* 
31.430%** 
12.88%** 
68.88%* 
.5352* 
4.258 
5504066000 
12.929% 
.1667% 
12.930% 
7.470% 
8.41% 
.16683 
4.239 
*Value is significantly larger for the non-swap firm 
at a level of 5%. 
**Value is significantly larger for the swap using 
firm at a level of 5%. 
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TABLE 3: Dependent and Independent Variable 
Means and Standard Deviations 
All Firms 
Mean Standard Dev. 
SHORT .5627 .187954 
DEBT/MV 63.9280 109.0080 
FIXED/MV 15.9628 20.2633 
SWAP/MV 1.8010 3.4880 
/3uj hat 3.9896 6.6480 
Non-swap Firms 
Mean Standard Dev. 
SHORT .5826 .199528 
DEBT/MV 51.1347 113.5082 
FIXED/MV 11.1212 19.6371 
^uj hat 3.0339 7.5256 
Swap-using Firms 
Mean Standard Dev. 
SHORT .5352 .166831 
DEBT/MV 81.5947 96.9333 
FIXED/MV 22.6490' 19.1840 
SWAP/MV 4.2580 4.2391 
^uj hat 5.3094 4.6810 
109 
TABLE 4: Correlation Matrix 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 Beta 1 .12 -.18 -.14 .09 
1 Short 1 -.33 -.20 -.13 
2 Fixed 1 .92 .52 
3 Debt 1 .27 
4 Swap 1 
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TABLE 5: Identification of Forecasting Model of Bond Returns 
AUTOCORRELATIONS PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS 
1: .303060 .303060 
2: .050656 -.045355 
3: .077990 .083514 
4: -.002149 -.054251 
5; .135171 .170624 
6: .068736 -.036377 
7; -.129644 -.148400 
8: -.193069 -.149934 
9: -.038788 .083611 
10: .070237 .073936 
Variance = .15139E-05 
FORECASTING MODEL OF BOND RETURNS 
Y = Percent change in 1 yr. T-Bill prices 
X = Y lagged once 
Y = .000058827 + .308891X + residuals 
(2.89183)* 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
F statistic = 8.363 
R2 = .0936 
Durbin Watson statistic = 1.97 
l^Alan Pankratz, Forecasting with Univariate Box-
Jenkins Models: Concepts and Cases (New York; John Wiley & 
Sons, 1983). A comparison of the estimated versus 
theoretical autocorrelations and partial correlations hinted 
at the use of a moving average term, but the simple auto-
regressive model was sufficient and in the interest of 
making the model parsimonious the questionable moving 
average term was not included in the final model. Also, the 
calculation of weekly bond returns is in itself a first 
difference, hence the data series was stationary. If this 
model were to forecast actual bond prices instead of weekly 
returns the mean would not have been stationary given the 
fall in interest rates that occurred during 1986. 
Ill 
(.5272)** ^ /3u j hat 
(-.1330) 
(.52445)** (-1.3243)** 
(.2681)* (.9239)** DEBT 
MV 
SHORT 
SWAP 
MV 
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
Figure 2. Path Diagram and Coefficients 
112 
Table 6: Regression Results 
EQUATION 5 
SHORT = -.133428175(SWAP/MV) 
(-.9328) 
EQUATION 6 
FIXED/MV = .524530910(SWAP/MV) 
(4.268)** 
EQUATION 7 
DEBT/MV = .268095525(SWAP/MV) 
(1.928)* 
EQUATION 8 
Pxin hat = -.058268797 (SHORT) -1.324345521 (FIXED/MV) 
(-.432) (-8.428)** 
+.923882829(DEBT/MV) +.527200053(SWAP/MV) 
(6.653)** (3.245)** 
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Table 7: Decomposition of Direct Effects 
in Equations 5, 6, 7, and 8 
Dependent Independent Total Direct 
Variables Variable Association Effect 
SHORT SWAP 
MV 
-.133 -.133 
FIXED 
MV 
5WAP 
MV 
.525 .525 
DEBT 
MV 
SWAP 
MV 
.268 .268 
jSu] hat SWAP 
MV 
.088 .527 
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Table 8: Decomposition of Indirect 
Effects of SWAPS/MV on hat 
Intermediate Indirect 
Variables Effect 
SHORT 
FIXED 
MV 
DEBT 
MV 
Total Indirect Effects 
.008 
-.695 
.248 
-.439 
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Table 9: Analysis of Effects of Independent 
Variables in Equation 8 on hat 
Total 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
SHORT . -.058 -.058 n.a. 
FIXED -1.32 -1.32 n.a. 
MV 
DEBT .92 .92 n.a. 
MV 
SWAP .09 .53 — .44 
MV 
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SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
This dissertation took a look at the use of interest 
rate swaps by savings and loan institutions. Section I 
described and discussed the use, reasons, and history of 
interest rate swaps. Section II demonstrated that from the 
savings and loan manager's point of view, interest rate 
swaps do not reduce the risk of the firm enough to justify 
using less capital financing. Section III suggested that 
interest rate swaps may have an indirect effect in reducing 
stock price fluctuations caused by unexpected changes in 
interest rates, but that the confidentiality of swap data 
severly limits one's ability to determine conclusively 
whether interest rate swaps are effective. 
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